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A Serendipitous Experiment in Percolation of Intellectual
Property Doctrine†
DANIEL R. CAHOY* AND LYNDA J. OSWALD**
What do we sacrifice when we put our faith in a specialized patent court? This article
breaks new ground by identifying and investigating a serendipitous natural
experiment in the development of intellectual property doctrine under a specialized
versus a percolating court system that allows us to address the trade-offs inherent in
court structures.
Since 1982, all patent-related appeals from district courts and the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office have been channeled to a single, specialized appellate court:
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Only the U.S. Supreme Court has
more say on patent issues, and its intervention is necessarily rare. The Federal
Circuit was established to eliminate the inconsistency that develops when multiple
appellate courts weigh in on an issue, as is the norm in most other areas of the law.
Notwithstanding the importance of doctrinal uniformity, scholars have pointed out
that multi-court “percolation” of issues has important advantages as well, such as
reducing judicial hyperactivity and activism. However, if U.S. patent law suffers
from the lack of percolation, there have not been concrete examples to date; there
has been only theory and speculation on this point.
A key predicate to our investigation is the fact that the patent and trademark
statutes have identical language related to fee shifting, but only the latter currently
percolates. Leveraging these contrasting jurisprudential states, our article assesses
six decades of patent and trademark case law to understand the impact of these two
conditions on doctrinal formation. The empirical evidence uncovered is powerful
and provides a novel understanding of a fundamental problem in common law legal
theory and policy. Significantly, we find that percolation does indeed have clear
advantages—it is more likely to result in doctrine that preserves the function of the
trial court and avoids inappropriate policy making. We track how Federal Circuit
doctrine moved further and further from that formed through percolation among the
regional circuits until the Supreme Court’s 2014 fee-shifting decisions reined in the
Federal Circuit and forced its interpretation of the statutory language back toward
the path pursued by the generalist circuit courts in the trademark area. The empirical
evidence thus provides powerful evidence that, regardless of the importance of
uniformity, there is a trade-off for investing a specialized court with the sole power
of statutory interpretation.
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** Louis and Myrtle Moskowitz Research Professor of Business and Law, Stephen M.
Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan.
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In the United States, patent doctrine is unique in that its development is dominated
by a single, specialized appellate court.1 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) hears all patent appeals from federal district courts, as
well as appeals from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on issues of
patentability. It is the practical end point for most patent issues, save the few that are
granted an audience before the U.S. Supreme Court. This structure is unparalleled in
the U.S. courts and stands out globally as an unusual component of a common law
system.2
The specialized nature of the Federal Circuit is no accident or anachronism. It was
specifically designed in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 as a means for
increasing the uniformity and predictability of patent doctrine.3 Prior to the creation
of the Federal Circuit, policy makers and the business community complained that
variability in patent law across the twelve regional federal appellate circuits led to an
uncertain environment for patent protection.4 They feared this uncertainty could
harm the innovation incentive that is a core rationale for patent rights.5 Congress

1. “Specialized” is generally used to describe a court whose jurisdiction is demarcated
by the subject matter of the cases it hears, as opposed to geography or to being a generalist
court. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526–
27 (2008); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1445–46 (2012).
2. The Federal Circuit is currently the only Article III specialized appellate court in the
federal court system. LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 14–15 tbl. 1.2 (2011).
3. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25,
37–39 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012)). Congress’s primary stated goals in establishing
the Federal Circuit as a specialized appellate court were “increas[ing] doctrinal stability in the
field of patent law” and “fill[ing] a void in the judicial system by creating an appellate forum
capable of exercising nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law [including patent
law] where Congress determines there is a special need for nationwide uniformity.” S. R EP.
NO. 97-275, at 2, 5 (1981).
4. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22 (1981); see also FRANK P. CIHLAR, THE COURT AMERICAN
BUSINESS WANTED AND GOT: THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT iii (1982) (noting that the reform legislation attracted support from an unusually
diverse set of constituencies). The Eleventh Circuit was formed on October 1, 1981, pursuant
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat.
1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 41 note (2012) (Amendments)). Prior to that, there
were eleven regional circuits (the First through the Tenth and the D.C. Circuit). See id.
5. E.g., Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings on
H.R. 6033, H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806, and H.R. 2414 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 574–75
(1980) (statement of Sidney A. Diamond, Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks); see also
COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 152 (1975). The commonly-articulated
potential benefits of specialized jurisdiction are (1) efficiency; (2) accuracy; and (3) uniformity
of doctrine, Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1447–48, while the potential detriments are
(1) potential bias or lack of independent judicial decision making; (2) less qualified judges;
and (3) “tunnel vision.” Id. at 1449–50. See generally Lynda J. Oswald, Improving Federal
Circuit Doctrine Through Increased Cross-Pollination, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 250–60 (2017)
(summarizing commentators’ arguments on the pros and cons of court specialization).
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intended to remedy the uncertainty by funneling all patent appeals into one
specialized circuit court, thereby fostering the development of a true national patent
jurisprudence.6 Since 1982, the Federal Circuit has been the primary voice on most
issues of patent law.
However, cracks have begun to appear in the Federal Circuit’s facade as the
definitive and most accurate source of patent rules.7 Frequently, decisions of the
court are criticized for their idiosyncratic and formalistic departures from established
legal doctrine in other fields.8 In addition, the court has experienced an increase in
scrutiny from the Supreme Court. In the first half of the Federal Circuit’s existence,
the Supreme Court rarely granted certiorari to patent issues, but now it is a
substantially more common occurrence.9 The Federal Circuit seems more plainly
fallible and in need of correction than initially perceived at its outset.
Some argue that the source of the problem is the specialized nature of the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction, which causes all patent appeals to be channeled to a single
appellate court.10 In contrast, issues arising in other areas of intellectual property law
such as copyrights and trademarks are appealed from district courts to one of the
twelve generalist regional circuits.11 This geographic distribution enables multiple

6. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 16–27 (1981) (discussing the purpose, background, and
need for the legislation).
7. See Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1442 (noting that scholars argue that “the Federal
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction leads to poor percolation of legal ideas, less experimentation
with legal principles, and, ultimately, a patent law that, although uniform, is insular and
severed from economic reality”).
8. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald, Complexity and Idiosyncrasy at the
Federal Circuit, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 216, 225–28 (2018); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 123 (2005); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2003); Peter Lee,
Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 405 (2012); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2
(2010); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); David O. Taylor, Formalism and
Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415
(2013); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 794 (2003).
“Classic formalism embraces the view that the law is a scientific system in which legal
institutions use rules to dictate correct outcomes in all cases.” Taylor, supra, at 423–24.
9. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Essay, The Federal Circuit’s Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U.
L. REV. 1061, 1082-83 (2017) (noting the shift in the relationship between the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court from the period of early circuit autonomy to current Federal Circuit
acquiescence); cf. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 387 (2001) (noting that prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit, the
Supreme Court was deeply involved in patent law jurisprudence but took on “benchwarmer”
status after 1982).
10. For a summary of this debate, see Oswald, supra note 5, at 250–55.
11. The Judiciary Act of 1891 (commonly known as the Evarts Act) created the first nine
courts of appeals and gave them jurisdiction over most appeals arising from the U.S district
courts. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. The D.C., Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits were added in 1893,
1929, and 1980, respectively. The U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD.
CTR., https:/www.fjc.gov/node/6766 [https://perma.cc/KK3D-JX3B].
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courts to rule on the same issue (albeit in different cases),12 theoretically permitting
more doctrinal experimentation and the opportunity to reach a more informed
consensus on the proper rule. This distributed decision-making is known as
“percolation.”13 That the Federal Circuit lacks percolation is well covered in the
literature as a theoretical topic.14 However, to date, it has not been possible to
definitively establish in the real world how a particular issue would be handled
differently in isolation versus percolation. A particular doctrine either percolates or
it does not, depending upon whether multiple courts or a single court has jurisdiction
to hear the issue.
This Article fills a gap in the literature by providing novel and unique empirical
evidence of the impact of percolated intellectual property doctrine versus the impact
of isolated doctrine from a specialized court. It relies on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
paired decisions in 2014 in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.15
and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc.16 to highlight a
natural forum for evaluating the effects of percolation on federal legal doctrine. At
issue in those cases was the fee-shifting language of Section 285 of the Patent Act:
“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.”17 Fortuitously, Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act, enacted twenty-two years
after Section 285, contains the identical provision for the trademark and specific
types of unfair competition cases that arise under it.18 Moreover, while patent appeals
are now heard exclusively by the Federal Circuit, appeals from Lanham Act cases go
to the regional circuits.19 The treatment of Lanham Act fee shifting in comparison to

12. See Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he decisions of
one circuit are not binding on other circuits.”).
13. See Oswald, supra note 5, at 255–60 (discussing role of percolation in the federal
court system).
14. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Bock, Restructuring the Federal Circuit, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL.
PROP. & ENT. L. 197 (2014); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent
Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505 (2013); Samuel
Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities:
An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (1984); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as
“Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56
UCLA L. REV. 657 (2009); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 350 (2014); Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution
Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471 (1983); Craig Allen Nard
& John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619
(2007); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay
on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761 (1983);
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 1111 (1990); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
67 (1995); Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in
Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523 (2004).
15. 572 U.S. 545 (2014).
16. 572 U.S. 559 (2014). While separate actions, these two cases were argued before the
Court on the same day (February 26, 2014) and decided on the same day (April 29, 2014).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012).
19. By statute, all cases arising under the Patent Act are appealed exclusively to the
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Patent Act fee shifting is thus a serendipitous natural experiment that allows a
comparison of two forms of doctrinal development.
Using this experimental lens, we engage in a detailed analysis of fee-shifting cases
and compare the results under percolation and specialization. Based on the literature,
our hypothesis is that percolation is likely to produce doctrine that, while
nonuniform, actually adheres more closely to statutory intent. We expect that the
percolation blunts the type of judicial hyperactivity20 and activism that mars the
decision-making of a specialized court like the Federal Circuit. And indeed, our
results bear this out. They demonstrate, for the first time, that lack of percolation led
to weaker doctrine in the Federal Circuit than in the regional circuits, despite
identical statutory language.
Part I of this Article puts the experiment in context by explaining the role of
generalist versus specialized courts in developing legal doctrine and the clear tradeoff between uniformity of doctrine and the advantages of percolation. It provides the
theoretical construct that is so in need of empirical validation. Part II begins the
empirical study by considering over six decades of Patent Act fee-shifting case law,
beginning with the first enactment of a statutory provision in 1946. It describes how,
when patent fee-shifting doctrine percolated through the regional circuits from 1946
to 1982, it was relatively stable, and outcomes were noncontroversial and largely
congruent with the Supreme Court’s rulings in Octane Fitness and Highmark half a
century later. However, with the 1982 introduction of the Federal Circuit as the sole
voice in intermediate patent appeals, percolation ceased. Patent fee-shifting doctrine
started to harden along rigid and inappropriate lines, eventually taking on the
formalistic, inflexible format that was ultimately struck down by the Court in 2014.
In Part III, the Article presents the contrasting case of Lanham Act fee-shifting
case law. The Lanham Act fee-shifting provision was adopted in 1974 and has always
percolated through the regional circuit courts. Doctrine developed under the Lanham
Act provision is less uniform than that found in patent law, as one would expect from
percolating doctrine. However, we demonstrate that the Lanham Act fee-shifting

Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). The Federal Circuit also hears trademark cases
arising from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board, addressing issues such as registration, cancellation, and renewal. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(4) (2012). The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over an eclectic collection
of other subject matters as well, including international trade, government contracts, federal
personnel, and veterans’ benefits. Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/GUW7-H9LL].
However, the court’s caseload is increasingly being dominated by patent appeals. In fiscal year
2018, for example, two-thirds of the Federal Circuit’s caseload consisted of patent appeals
originating in either the district courts or the USPTO. Appeals Filed, by Category, FY 2018,
U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the
-court/statistics/CaseloadbyCategory2018_-_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W57-CUVC]. Most
other cases arising from the federal district courts, including trademark infringement cases
under the Lanham Act, are appealed to the relevant regional circuit court. See 28 U.S.C. §
1291 (2012).
20. See, e.g., William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The
Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 735–39
(2000) (describing the Federal Circuit’s hyperactivity in considering arguments raised for the
first time on appeal).
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doctrine was more consistent with the Supreme Court’s eventual edicts in Octane
Fitness and Highmark than was the nonpercolating doctrine of the specialized
Federal Circuit. Part IV concludes that percolation does indeed have clear
advantages; it is more likely to result in doctrine that preserves the function of the
trial court and avoids inappropriate policy making, although at the cost of uniformity
in doctrine. Trade-offs indeed must be made when choosing court structures. We
discuss our findings and suggest lessons to be learned that may lead to improvements
and more informed analysis of the Federal Circuit.
I.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN PERCOLATION

The Federal Circuit’s specialized jurisdiction is intentionally designed to diverge
from the standard way that legal questions move through the federal court system.
Before addressing this unique structure, it is useful to consider how doctrine
normally develops under the multi-circuit scheme of the U.S. courts. The theoretical
structural advantages and disadvantages of the Federal Circuit then become clearer
in contrast. With that contrast in mind, one appreciates the power of identifying, for
comparison and contrast, a specific legal rule that has been developed under both
conditions, in serial and parallel time periods.
A. Percolation Versus Specialization
When a decision from one of the United States’ ninety-four judicial districts is
appealed, it is assigned to the appropriate regional circuit court.21 Because those
circuits are separate equals, they can hear the same issue and determine their own
resolution, unless and until the Supreme Court renders a nationwide rule. The way
that doctrinal issues bubble up somewhat unpredictably from circuit to circuit is
appropriately described as “percolation.”
Simply put, percolation arises when multiple courts consider and develop the law
simultaneously in multiple settings.22 It occurs automatically in the bulk of the
federal system. The distributed nature of intermediate appellate jurisdiction enables
the issues these courts hear to be fully explored and developed through successive or
contemporaneous court opinions, which may or may not be congruent. As discussed
by Professors Estreicher and Sexton, this exploration can lead to deeper analysis and
more innovative doctrine as a result of coequal courts considering each other’s
decisions,23 may allow the regional circuits to work their way to consistent doctrine

21. The geographic boundaries of the regional circuits are shown at Geographic
Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts, U.S.
CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/u.s._federal_courts_circuit_map_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B34H-CBNC].
22. See Oswald, supra note 5, at 255–60.
23. Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 14, at 699 n.68; See also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN
SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL PROCESS 47 (1986); MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE
COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 57 (1999); Charles L. Black, Jr., The
National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L J. 883, 898 (1974); Revesz, supra
note 14, at 1114.

2020]

A S ER E N DIP I TO US E X P ERI ME NT

45

without Supreme Court involvement,24 and encourages experimentation with
different doctrines that can more fully inform future Supreme Court action if circuit
conflicts do not resolve on their own.25 In short, the percolation that arises
automatically in a federal court system having multiple, coequal appellate courts
helps ensure that alternatives are thoroughly analyzed and considered before doctrine
is settled.
The downside of percolation, of course, is the potential for at least short-term lack
of uniformity in doctrine. Because each regional circuit court sets its own
precedents,26 percolation can result in a period of disuniformity in federal doctrine
(i.e., circuit splits) where federal doctrine (which theoretically should be uniform)
diverges among the circuits.27 Circuit splits can result in some obvious detriments,
including uncertainty in the law, disparate outcomes for similarly situated parties,
and incentives for forum shopping.28 Nonetheless, a certain level of disuniformity is
not only tolerated but embraced within the federal legal system because of the
advantages that arise from having multiple courts address issues in a variety of
manners.29 As Estreicher and Sexton explained: “It may be that such disuniformity
was an unintended byproduct of a geographically dispersed, decentralized judicial
structure; but it is a feature that has endured . . . because the system’s commitment
to uniformity is qualified by a policy in favor of intercircuit experimentation.”30 In a
sense, circuit splits are the price we pay to obtain the benefits of doctrinal percolation.
Some commentators view this as a worthwhile trade-off. For example, Professor
Dreyfuss argued that “in a country as complex as the United States, the adjudicatory
system is stronger when courts have overlapping jurisdiction and the independence
to question one another, modify each other’s outcomes, and resolve similar issues
differently.”31 She concluded that “the Supreme Court benefits from—and depends
upon—this activity; and that percolation provides important information to
Congress.”32 Similarly, Professors Nard and Duffy argued that circuit splits

24. Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 14, at 699 n.68.
25. Id.
26. Each circuit’s precedents then become binding on all district courts within its circuit
(but not upon any outside its circuit). See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted); WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 173–74 (4th ed. 2006).
27. See generally Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008)
(discussing the role of circuit splits in the federal legal system).
28. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1449 (2009).
29. E.g., John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177,
183 (1982); see also Arthur D. Hellman, Preserving the Essential Role of the Supreme Court:
A Comment on Justice Rehnquist's Proposal, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 15, 22 (1986) (discussing
Justice William Rehnquist’s approval of percolation prior to a grant of certiorari that he
articulated in United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984)).
30. ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 23, at 48 (citation omitted), quoted in Nard &
Duffy, supra note 14, at 1651 n.111; See also Oswald, supra note 5, at 255 n.37 (citing sources
arguing that circuit splits are often inconsequential or even promote sound doctrinal
development).
31. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 523.
32. Id.
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contribute to better lawyering, better and more comprehensive presentation of
information by the litigants, and hence, better judicial decision-making.33
However, some commentators argue that the disuniformity produced by
percolation offsets any advantages that might arise from having multiple courts
analyzing and creating doctrine. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, found
this aspect of percolation troubling: “[T]hat it is actually desirable to allow important
questions of federal law to ‘percolate’ in the lower courts for a few years before the
Supreme Court takes them on seems to me a very strange suggestion; at best it is
making a virtue of necessity.”34 Professor Meador, a key architect of the Federal
Circuit, dismissed percolation in the statutory interpretation setting as “a euphemism
for incoherence.”35 Similarly, Professor Bator declared that “percolation is not a
purposeful project. It is just a way of postponing decision . . . .”36 However, unless
the Supreme Court steps in or Congress avails itself of the opportunity to pass
clarifying legislation to resolve a circuit split, the conflict in federal law will persist
unless the regional circuits work their way toward consensus on their own through
successive panel or en banc decisions.37
The use of a specialized appellate court is a choice against percolation. It greatly
reduces the potential for disuniformity and eliminates the risk of circuit splits, but at
the cost of short circuiting the percolation effect of diverse intermediate appellate
courts.38 Without peer courts issuing opinions in the same area, some scholars fear,

33. Nard & Duffy, supra note 14, at 1633.
34. William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1986).
35. Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 634 (1989).
36. Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 690
(1990); see also id. at 689 (arguing that “perpetuating uncertainty and instability during a
process of percolation exacts important and painful costs” upon litigants); Erwin N. Griswold,
The Federal Courts Today and Tomorrow: A Summary and Survey, 38 S.C. L. REV. 393, 406
(1987) (arguing that law based upon percolating doctrine rather than a clear binding precedent
is “difficult to ascertain, unpredictable, and highly dependent on the outlook of a particular
judge who considers the case”).
37. The Supreme Court Rules list an intercircuit split on an “important matter” as one of
several factors to be considered in determining whether the Court should grant a petition for
writ of certiorari. SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari”).
However, the Supreme Court grants certiorari in fewer than one-half of the circuit splits
presented to it each year. See Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court
Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 193
tbl.2 (2001) (detailing data from the 1986 through 1999 Supreme Court terms); George &
Guthrie, supra note 28, at 1449. Lack of Supreme Court action does not necessarily mean that
the circuit split will persist, however. As Justice Ginsburg noted: “There is, of course, an ideal
intercircuit conflict resolver. . . . Congress itself. On the correct interpretation of federal
statutes, no assemblage is better equipped to say which circuit got it right.” See A Bill to
Establish an Intercircuit Panel, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 704 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 115 (1985) (statement of
J. Ruth Bader Ginsburg) (Justice Ginsburg was a judge on the D.C. Circuit at the time).
38. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to
Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 828–29 (2010).
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the specialized court may not be motivated to generate detailed or persuasive
opinions, and may fall back on arcane or dense vocabulary, complex, overly refined
rule systems, or excessive formalism.39 Lack of percolation thus may lead to
suboptimal doctrine.
In addition to shortfalls in doctrinal formation, a lack of percolation may foster
problematic tendencies in overall judicial decision-making. Of particular concern is
“hyperactivity.” As Professors Rooklidge and Weil articulated the concept,
hyperactivity is an appellate court’s improper intrusion into the established role of
the trial court.40 Specialized courts are more likely to succumb to the temptation to
intrude due to their mandate of uniformity and belief in their own expertise.41 In
contrast, percolating generalist courts are less inclined toward hyperactivity due to
the sheer burden of their caseloads. The variety of cases they hear make the
production of complex and detailed enhancements of doctrine more difficult and less
desirable.42 A percolating court will tend to restrain itself to its proper role.
Another concern is that specialization may lead to judicial activism. Judicial
activism (at least by some definitions) is the tendency of a court to craft law in
furtherance of certain ideology or make policy instead of reserving such power to the
political branches.43 A more isolated court can fall prey to the temptation to place
itself above policymakers due to its confidence in its superior expertise.44 Such

39. See, e.g., David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 848
(1999); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989); Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1440–41 (citing PAUL D.
CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 168 (1976));
Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary,
37 A.B.A. J. 425, 426 (1951); Thomas, supra note 8, at 796–808.
40. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 20, at 726.
41. See Ted L. Field, “Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical
Study, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 721, 775 (2012) (noting that the average number of cases pending
per judge for the regional circuits in 2008 was 426.7, but was only 78.9 for the Federal Circuit,
and suggesting that this may be a reason for the Federal Circuit’s hyperactivity); Arti K. Rai,
Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 883
(2002) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has asserted power over fact. . . . [B]y simply declaring claim
construction to be a pure question of law subject to de novo review.”).
42. Cf. Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 589 (2003) (suggesting that hyperactivity in the Federal
Circuit may be the result of its large patent caseload and perceived mandate to clarify patent
law).
43. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987)
(defining judicial activism as “an illegitimate intrusion by the courts into the realm properly
reserved to the political branches of government”).
44. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 683, 688 (1993). Judge Newman described how activism could specifically
impact the Federal Circuit:
The Federal Circuit has been shielded, by its diverse jurisdiction and the breadth
of experience of its judges, from the pitfalls of a “specialized” court wherein a
cadre of experts, secure in its superior knowledge of the policy that the law
should serve, comes to view itself as judge, advocate, and jury. Caution is needed
lest our increasing maturity expose us to this pitfall. It is policy choices that lead
to departure from precedent, into the judicial activism that weighs against legal

48

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:39

activism is less likely in the case of a percolating court because of the diversity of
cases it hears.45
At the time of the Federal Circuit’s creation in 1982, Congress’s primary stated
goals were to “increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent law”46 and to “fill a
void in the judicial system by creating an appellate forum capable of exercising
nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law [including patent law] where
Congress determines there is a special need for nationwide uniformity.”47 Congress
expressly recognized that some of the regional circuits were seen as “‘pro-patent’
and other [sic] ‘anti-patent’” and found that the divergent approaches to patent law
among the regional circuits were counterproductive and expensive.48 By contrast, the
creation of a single appellate court for patents would provide a mechanism for
ensuring that patent rights would be “more stable and predictable.”49 In short, in
creating the Federal Circuit, Congress made a conscious decision to reject the
benefits of percolation in order to advance the benefits of court specialization—
particularly, the fostering of uniformity of patent law.
But given the advantages of percolation and pitfalls of specialization, what impact
has the trade-off chosen by Congress had upon the development of patent doctrine?
That historically has been a difficult question to answer empirically. Scholars have
examined the role of percolation in the specialized court setting, but these analyses
have been largely theoretical.50 However, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
in Octane Fitness and Highmark, coupled with the fortuitous happenstance of
identical fee-shifting provisions in the Patent and Lanham Acts, provide a rare and
remarkable ready-made experiment for evaluating the role that percolation plays in
shaping accurate federal doctrine.
B. Two Observable Settings for Intellectual Property Doctrinal Development
Parallel sections of the Patent and Lanham Acts use identical language in granting
the district courts discretion in awarding attorney fees: “The court in exceptional
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”51 Patent appeals,
of course, fall under the specialized jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit; Lanham Act

stability. Although all judicial decisions reflect, to some degree, the judge's
personal predilections, policy choices are not the province of judges.
Id.
45. See id.
46. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981).
47. Id. at 2; see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 16–27 (1981) (discussing the purpose,
background, and need for H.R. 4482, 97th Cong. (1981) (enacted), which established the
Federal Circuit).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–21.
49. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6.
50. See supra note 14. Commentators have lamented the difficulty of constructing an
instrument that would allow accurate measurement of the Federal Circuit’s overall success or
failure as a specialized court in meaningful, significant empirical terms. See, e.g., Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 769, 772 (2004); Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law,
89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 850–54 (2012).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
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appeals, by contrast, are heard by the regional circuits.52 As a result, the fee-shifting
language of these two acts provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the effects of
percolation by examining doctrinal development of identical statutory provisions in
two settings: one arising in a specialized court context with no percolation and one
in a generalist court context with significant percolation.
Litigation procedure in the United States generally follows the “American Rule,”
under which, in the absence of a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary,
each litigant pays his or her own attorney fees, regardless of success or failure in the
litigation.53 The American Rule was recognized by the Supreme Court as early as
1796.54 It stands in stark contrast to the “English Rule,” under which the losing party
is responsible for the attorney fees of its opponent as well as its own.55 A 1974 Senate
report discussed the historical context of the American Rule and its development in
the early years of the country’s development, noting that in a system in which few
litigants hired attorneys, the issue of fee awards rarely arose.56 When it did arise,
courts were fearful that allowing such awards would restrict access to the courts,
discourage litigants from bringing suits in which outcomes were not certain,
encourage excessive attorney fees, and pose difficulties for courts in calculating
appropriate fees.57

52. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining the jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit in patent and trademark cases).
53. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (“‘Our basic
point of reference’ when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle
known as the ‘“American Rule”’: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose,
unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” (citations omitted)). See generally Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247–63 (1975) (providing history of
the American Rule); John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984); Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys’ Fees for
Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L. REV. 613, 613–14 (1983); Kenneth W. Starr, The
Shifting Panorama of Attorneys' Fees Awards: The Expansion of Fee Recoveries in Federal
Court, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 189 (1986); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee
Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570–90 (1993).
54. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (per curiam) (“The
general practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to [fee shifting]; and even if that
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is
changed, or modified, by statute.” (emphasis omitted)).
55. Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 46–47 (1984); Jacob Singer, Note, Bad Faith Fee-Shifting in Federal
Courts: What Conduct Qualifies?, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV 693, 695 (2010).
56. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 4–5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7133
(prepared in conjunction with the statutory amendment allowing recovery of attorney fees in
the trademark context).
57. Id. As summarized by the Supreme Court, the American Rule promotes broad access
to the courts by not penalizing a party “for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit.”
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also
Richard J. Leighton, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in “Exceptional” Lanham Act Cases: A
“Jumble” of “Murky” Law, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 849, 852 (2012) (explaining the theory
behind the American Rule).
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Despite over two hundred statutes today authorizing awards of attorney fees in
specific types of cases,58 fee shifting is still considered an exception to the general
norm of the American Rule.59 A court’s departure from the American Rule is thus an
event of particular note in a litigation. Because the Patent and Lanham Acts happen
to have identical fee-shifting language, it is possible to review the resulting cases and
draw direct comparisons as to how the doctrine regarding the application of this
legislative language has developed in the two fields.
II. PERCOLATION AND STATUTORY FEE SHIFTING UNDER THE PATENT ACT
The history of recovery of attorney fees in patent litigation is one of frequently
morphing parameters, as not only did the statutory provisions for fee shifting change
over time, but patent appeals relocated from the percolation-rich environment of the
regional circuits to the more isolated setting of the Federal Circuit in 1982. Moving
from a nonshifting regime to a more flexible system as a result of statutory revision,
and then to a rigid and narrow standard through the actions of a specialized court, the
environment for litigants changed substantially over a period of nearly 100 years. As
a result, there is a solid basis for experimental comparison. In fact, as this Part
demonstrates, the patent arena even by itself provides a rich environment for
examining the effects of percolation on doctrinal development.
A. Fee Shifting Under the 1946 Patent Act
For the first one and one-half centuries of U.S patent law, the American Rule
prevailed in patent litigation.60 Attorney fees were not considered a proper element

58. Vargo, supra note 53, at 1588; see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN,
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 716 (Concise 5th ed. 2019); Peter N.
Cubita, Jeffrey S. Lichtman & Daniel D. Rubino, Note, Award of Attorney’s Fees in the
Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277, 286–89 (1982).
59. Statutory provisions authorizing fee shifting can be found in all areas of federal
intellectual property law today. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (addressing fee shifting in
trademark actions); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (addressing fee shifting in copyright actions); 18
U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D) (Supp. 2019) (addressing fee-shifting in civil trade secret
misappropriation actions); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (addressing fee shifting in patent actions). The
Copyright Act was the first federal intellectual property statute to provide for fee shifting, in
1909; its language is broad and, unlike the Patent and Lanham Acts, does not limit recovery
to particularly egregious cases. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 40, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012)) (“That in all actions, suits, or proceedings under
this Act, except when brought by or against the United States or any officer thereof, full costs
shall be allowed, and the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs.”).
60. There were rare exceptions where the courts used their common law powers to
provide for attorney fees in patent cases in unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Parker Rust Proof
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 23 F.2d 502, 506 (E.D. Mich. 1928) (awarding attorney fees to
compensate patent owner for unnecessary expenses incurred as a result of defendant’s
behavior); Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas. 957, 958 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (“[T]he jury are
at liberty, if they see fit, to allow the plaintiff as part of his ‘actual damage,’ any expenditure
for counsel fees . . . which were necessarily incurred to vindicate the rights derived under his
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of damage or remedies, and each side bore its own costs of counsel in patent
litigation.61 Then, in 1946, Congress amended the patent statutes, giving the district
courts discretionary authority to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.62 Specifically, Section 70 provided: “The court may in its discretion award
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on any
patent case.”63
In 1975, Ahart published a comprehensive overview of the history of attorney fee
recovery in patent cases.64 As he explained, the 1946 fee-shifting language was
introduced initially in H.R. 5231, which provided that a prevailing patent owner,
upon showing patent infringement, should be able to recover costs and “expenses.”65
The Assistant Commissioner of Patents argued that the term “expenses” was overly
broad and unusual in the statutory context and suggested that the term “reasonable
attorneys fees to be fixed by the court” be adopted instead.66 The Commissioner of
Patents supported this proposed language change,67 and H.R. 5231 was reported out
of the House Committee with this amendment regarding attorney fees included.68
Ahart identified this as the first apparent mention of fee shifting in the U.S. patent
statutes.69
H.R. 5311 then replaced H.R. 5231.70 According to Ahart, the primary purpose of
H.R. 5311 was to switch recovery in patent infringement suits from profits and
damages (which required an often lengthy and expensive showing of actual profits)
to the more easily shown general damages instead.71 The provision for recovery of
attorney fees was simply a small part of this larger reform package. As introduced,
H.R. 5311 adopted H.R 5231’s language that a patent owner could recover

patent, and are not taxable in the bill of costs.”).
61. For example, in Teese v. Huntingdon, the Supreme Court stated that “[c]ounsel fees
are not a proper element for the consideration of the jury in the estimation of damages in
actions for the infringement of a patent right.” 64 U.S (23 How.) 2, 8–9 (1859); see also Philp
v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460, 462 (1873) (“Counsel fees cannot be included in the [patent
infringement] verdict.”).
62. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946))
(amended 1952) (amending section 4921 of the Revised Statutes).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946) (amended 1952).
64. Alan M. Ahart, Attorneys’ Fees: The Patent Experience, 57 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 608
(1975). Ahart was an LLM student at the time; he went on to become a bankruptcy judge for
the Central District of California in 1988.
65. Id. at 615 (citation omitted). The language of H.R. 5231 was quoted in the committee
hearing on H.R. 5231 (reported as H.R. 5311). Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: Hearing
on H.R. 5231 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 79th Cong. (1946) [hereinafter Hearings].
66. Ahart, supra note 64, at 615 (citation omitted). The comments of the Assistant
Commissioner of Patents can be found at Hearings, supra note 65, at 10 (statement of Conder
C. Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Patents).
67. Hearings, supra note 65, at 14 (statement of Casper W. Ooms, Commissioner of
Patents).
68. Ahart, supra note 64, at 616 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 615.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 79-1587, at 1).
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“reasonable” attorney fees.72 The Senate Committee on Patents, however, broadened
the fee-shifting language considerably by providing that any prevailing party,
whether the patent owner or not, could recover reasonable attorney fees, but only at
the discretion of the trial court (which had authority not only to set the amount but
also to decline to award any recovery of fees).73
The Senate’s version was enacted in Section 70 of the Patent Act in 1946.74 The
legislative history made clear congressional expectation that recovery of attorney
fees was to be regarded as an uncommon remedy for extreme situations and was not
to become the norm in patent cases.75 Giving the trial court discretion to award
attorney fees in addition to its existing discretion to award treble damages was
believed to “discourage infringement of a patent by anyone thinking that all he would
be required to pay if he loses the suit would be a royalty.”76 In addition, the language
was “made general” so that the trial court would be able “to prevent a gross injustice
to an alleged infringer.”77
In 1946, of course, the Federal Circuit was decades away from being formed. The
regional circuit courts still had jurisdiction over patent appeals, and thus by
definition, the new fee-shifting language percolated among the eleven circuit courts
then in existence.78 Section 70 had just a brief six-year life span, however, before
being replaced by Section 285 in 1952.79 There were few published appellate cases
addressing the recovery of attorney fees under Section 70—fewer than thirty80—
reflecting both the provision’s short life and the relatively small number of patent
cases filed during that time period.81

72. Id. at 616.
73. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 79-1503 (1946); 92 CONG. REC. 9188 (1946) (statement of Sen.
Pepper)).
74. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946))
(amended 1952).
75. S. REP. NO. 79-1503, at 2 (1946).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. In 1946, the First through the Tenth Circuits and the D.C. Circuit were in place.
Today, following the creation of the Eleventh Circuit in 1980 and the Federal Circuit in 1982,
there are thirteen circuit courts. See The U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Federal Judiciary,
supra note 11.
79. See Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§
101–376).
80. A LexisAdvance search conducted on Jan. 16, 2019, revealed 30 appellate decisions
between 1946 and 1952. The search terms were “35 usc 70 and attorney! fee!”, the search was
limited to courts of appeals decisions, and the date parameters were January 1, 1946, to
December 31, 1955. (The end date was extended past the repeal date of Section 70 to pick up
cases in progress but not yet decided at the time of amendment.)
81. For fiscal year (FY) 1941 (ending June 30, 1941), 953 patent cases were filed in the
district courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 56 (1946). The number of patent
cases filed in the trial courts declined significantly during the war years. See id. (noting that
543 patent cases were filed before the district courts in FY 1942; 318 in FY 1943; 225 in FY
1944; and 226 in FY 1945). Although the number of cases rose between 1946 and 1952, the
numbers remained significantly below the FY 1941 patent-case filings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF
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Section 70 was apparently uncontroversial at the time of its adoption and during
its fleeting enactment. The handful of appellate cases addressing Section 70 looked
for evidence of “unfairness or bad faith,”82 “vexatious and unjustified litigation,”83
or other “equitable considerations”84 that would justify fee shifting. They cautioned
that fee shifting was not to be applied as “a matter of course” but rather only where
it was necessary “to prevent a gross injustice.”85 The trial court was required to
clearly state the grounds for making such an award,86 but decisions rested solely
within the discretion of the trial court.87
“Bad faith” and “gross injustice” quickly emerged as key concepts in delineating
judicial application of Section 70. For example, in a leading decision issued five
years after Section 70’s enactment, Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, the Ninth
Circuit reviewed the legislative history and decisions by trial and appellate courts
and summarized the state of the law thus:
The exercise of discretion in favor of such an allowance should be
bottomed upon a finding of unfairness or bad faith in the conduct of the
losing party, or some other equitable consideration of similar force,
which makes it grossly unjust that the winner of the particular law suit
be left to bear the burden of his own counsel fees . . . .88

THE U.S. COURTS,

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 85 (1950); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 87 (1952)
(noting that 299 patent cases were filed before the district courts in FY 1946; 370 in FY 1947;
476 in FY 1948; 560 in FY 1949; 689 in FY 1950; 589 in FY 1951; and 519 in FY 1952). The
number of appeals taken from the cases filed would be significantly lower, of course, and the
number of appeals raising fee-shifting issues lower yet.
82. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Ruby Lighting Corp., 191 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1951); see
also Turchan v. Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co., 208 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1953); Faulkner v.
Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 642 (9th Cir. 1952).
83. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 91 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D. Md.), aff’d,
185 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1950) (adopting trial court’s opinion “as an expression of [its own]
views”); Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Rochester Ropes, 199 F.2d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1952) (citing
Phillips Petroleum, 91 F. Supp. 215, aff’d, 185 F.2d 672).
84. Faulkner, 199 F.2d at 642.
85. Pennsylvania Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F.2d 445, 450–51 (3d Cir.
1951). See also Blanc v. Spartan Tool Co., 178 F.2d 104, 105 (7th Cir. 1949) (attorney fees
are “not to be allowed in the usual patent case”).
86. E.g., Faulkner, 199 F.2d at 642.
87. “Discretion” itself was a well-understood and noncontroversial concept. In the words
of the Seventh Circuit:
Judicial discretion . . . is impartial reasoning, guided and controlled in its exercise
by fixed legal principles, requiring the court, in consideration of the facts and
circumstances, to decide as its reason and conscience dictate; it requires that the
court be discreet, just, circumspect and impartial, and that it exercise cautious
judgment. The term connotes the opposite of caprice and arbitrary action.
Dixie Cup Co. v. Paper Container Mfg. Co., 174 F.2d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1949).
88. 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th Cir. 1951) (citing cases). The Park-In-Theatres court set aside
the trial court’s award of attorney fees, finding the suit had not been brought in “bad faith,”
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The appellate courts did overturn some attorney-fee awards where they found the
trial court had abused its discretion, such as by failing to state the grounds for the
award or by granting an award where the case presented “difficulties and
uncertainties” sufficient to justify the litigation,89 but in general, application of
Section 70 generated little apparent controversy.
The analysis in most of the appellate opinions addressing Section 70 was fairly
perfunctory. Published awards of attorney fees were relatively infrequent and
involved overtly egregious circumstances, such as where the defendant willfully
infringed the plaintiff’s patent,90 where the patent owner engaged in fraud on the
USPTO in obtaining the patent at issue,91 or where the patent owner’s delay in suing
detrimentally affected the defendant’s position such that it would have been
inequitable for the court to enforce the patent.92
A few trial courts attempted to flesh out the standard for awarding attorney fees.
For example, one district court attempted to define the elusive concepts of “bad faith”
and “good faith” by proving examples. A lawsuit “begun for some ulterior purpose
with no intention of prosecuting it to the finish or with a certainty that it cannot
succeed,” or “an infringement suit upon an expired patent or upon one invalidated
by a judgment of the highest court or where the charge of infringement is plainly a
sham” would be instances of bad faith.93 Merely filing an unsuccessful lawsuit is not,
however, as that would render the action of every unsuccessful plaintiff suspect.94
Another district court expanded on the definition of “inequitable conduct,” noting
that it included acts such as “undue harassment, unnecessary prolongation of proofs,
or the wrongful commencement of a wholly unfounded action brought for malicious
purposes and not merely to determine the issues of validity and infringement.”95
Another judge seemed to view the fee-shifting statute as an issue of broader public
policy, stating: “I think it would be detrimental to the patent system to allow
attorney’s fees, except in cases where the Court feels one party or another has been

id., or on mere “surmise or suspicion,” id. at 143, and the litigants and lawyers had not engaged
in “dilatory tactics,” id. The award was thus not necessary “to prevent a gross injustice.” Id.
Park-In-Theatres was frequently cited by later courts applying 35 U.S.C. § 285, the successor
provision to Section 70. See, e.g., Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1969); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 480 (8th
Cir. 1965); Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 475 n.11 (5th Cir. 1958);
R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden’s, Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 501 (3d Cir. 1956).
89. See Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Rochester Ropes, 199 F.2d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1952).
90. Krieger v. Colby, 106 F. Supp. 124, 132 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
91. Dubil v. Rayford Camp & Co., 184 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1950).
92. Brennan v. Hawley Prods. Co., 98 F. Supp. 369, 370 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (noting that
during plaintiff’s delay, defendant made extensive, expensive expansions to its manufacturing
facilities, and two of its key witnesses died); see also Orrison v. C. Hoffberger Co., 190 F.2d
787, 791 (4th Cir. 1951) (affirming trial court’s award of fees where trial court had determined
that the patent owner’s motion for a new trial was “vexatious and unjustified” so as to
unnecessarily extend litigation).
93. Jacquard Knitting Mach. Co. v. Ordnance Gauge Co., 108 F. Supp. 59, 70 (E.D. Pa.
1952).
94. Id.
95. Vischer Prods. Co. v. Nat’l Pressure Cooker Co., 92 F. Supp. 138, 139 (W.D. Wis.
1950).
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guilty of unfair or oppressive methods in pursuing the legal remedies allowed.”96 Yet
another added an idiosyncratic gloss to fee shifting when it indicated that the relative
wealth of the parties was a relevant consideration: “An award of attorney’s fees is
appropriate where the infringement complained of has been willful and the parties
are disparate in resource.”97
Generally, however, judicial application of the 1946 fee-shifting language was
noncontroversial and relied upon the exercise of discretion by the trial courts,
bounded by the above-stated flexible but seemingly well-understood standard of
addressing “bad faith” behavior and preventing “gross injustice.” In part, this
doctrinal stability could be explained by the relatively short life of Section 70, which
provided scant time for doctrine to evolve along divergent lines in the various
circuits, and in part because the legislative intent that recovery of attorney fees was
to be an extraordinary event reserved for the most egregious cases was wellrecognized and well-accepted by trial and appellate courts alike. Courts set a high
standard for fee awards, and recovery of attorney fees was indeed the extraordinary
exception and not the norm during this time period.
B. Fee Shifting Under the Patent Act of 1952
In 1952, Congress enacted a wholesale revision of the patent law, the Patent Act
of 1952.98 That revision introduced Section 285, the current fee-shifting language,
which made two significant changes to the language of Section 70: (1) the qualifier
“exceptional” was inserted to describe the type of cases in which fee shifting was
appropriate, and (2) the words “in its discretion” were deleted. These changes can be
seen through a direct comparison of the two provisions:
Section 70: “The court may in its discretion award reasonable attorney’s
fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on any patent
case.”99
Section 285: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”100
Despite the alterations, Congress and the courts regarded these revisions to the
fee-shifting language as nonsubstantive and as being made “for purposes of
clarification” only.101 The Senate report, for example, indicated that the new

96. Air Devices, Inc. v. Air Factors, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 819, 822 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
97. Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Co., 99 F. Supp. 803, 808 (D. Del. 1951). Although
the court did not expand on the relevance of the parties’ wealth to the recovery of fees, one
can surmise that this falls under the category of “other equitable considerations.” It does not
appear that other courts adopted this same criterion.
98. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–
376).
99. 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946) (amended 1952).
100. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
101. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653 n.8 (1983) (noting
addition of “exceptional cases” language to § 285 was “for purposes of clarification only”);
Hoge Warren Zimmermann Co. v. Nourse & Co., 293 F.2d 779, 783 (6th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he
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language was “substantially the same” as the existing Section 70, but that the phrase
“‘in exceptional cases’ ha[d] been added as expressing the intention of the present
statute as shown by its legislative history and as interpreted by the courts.”102 When
questioned in a 1951 hearing about the significance of the addition of “exceptional”
to the statutory language, P.J. Federico, Examiner-in-Chief of the USPTO and a key
drafter of the 1952 Act, explained:
The present statute says that the court may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party; which was introduced into the law by an act
of 1946.
The hearings and the reports of the committees showed that they
intended that to apply to exceptional cases without going into detail, and
the court decisions have followed that principle of awarding attorney fees
in exceptional cases.
What that constitutes is left, and stays left, to the discretion of the
court that is conducting the case.103
Thus, in many ways, Section 285 can be seen as a simple continuation of Section
70. And, as the next subpart demonstrates, doctrine under Section 285 did in fact
follow the same path as Section 70 for several decades, deviating only after formation
of the Federal Circuit in 1982.
1. Percolation from 1953 to 1982
The regional circuits heard many more cases under Section 285 than they had
under Section 70.104 In part, this reflected the much longer time span involved:

substitution of the phrase ‘in exceptional cases’ has not done away with the discretionary
feature.”); R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden’s Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 501 (3d Cir. 1956) (“The phrase
‘exceptional circumstance’ is not contained in the prior law, but confirms to the interpretation
of the prior law by the cases.” (citation omitted)).
102. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 30 (1952).
103. Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3760 Before the Subcomm.
No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 108–09 (1951) (statement of P.J. Federico,
Examiner-in-Chief, U.S. Patent Office), http://www.ipmall.info/sites/default/files/hosted
_resources/lipa/patents/patentact/14_jun_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7C52-G7X].
Federico
repeated this stance in his published commentary on the new Patent Act. See P.J. Federico,
Commentary on the new Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. Vol. 1 (1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y (1993), http://www.ipmall.info/sites/default/files/hosted_resources
/lipa/patents/federico-commentary.asp#Remedies [https://perma.cc/8CKC-P8VT]; see also
98 CONG. REC. 9097 (1952) (statement of Sen. Wiley) (1952 bill “simply constitutes a
restatement of the patent law[]”); 98 CONG. REC. 9323 (1952) (statement of Sen. McCarran)
(bill codifies “the present patent laws”).
104. A LexisAdvance search on Jan. 16, 2019, turned up 396 cases. (The search was “35
USC 285 and attorney! fee!" from January 1, 1953 (the effective date of the 1952 Patent Act)
to December 31, 1985 (to pick up cases in progress that were decided by the regional circuits
after the date of creation of the Federal Circuit), and was limited to federal courts of appeals
cases.) Not all were on point, of course.
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Section 285 was enacted on July 19, 1952, and took effect on January 1, 1953. Patent
appeals remained under the jurisdiction of the regional circuits until the Federal
Circuit was formed on October 1, 1982, giving the regional circuits almost thirty
years in which to develop fee-shifting doctrine under this provision. In addition, there
was an upward trend in the number of issued patents during this time period;105
between the increase in patent activity and the simple passage of time,106 the courts
had more opportunity to analyze attorney fees requests.
Despite this increased activity, there were few changes in patent fee-shifting
doctrine following the switch from Section 70 to Section 285. The purpose of fee
shifting remained essentially the same: to address “unnecessary and vexatious,”107
“vexatious and unjustified,”108 or “bad faith” litigation,109 or to prevent gross
injustice.110 The courts continued to emphasize that attorney fees were to be the
exception, not the norm.111
One indicator of how noncontroversial the fee-shifting doctrine of Section 285
was when applied by the regional circuits is the dearth of contemporaneous
commentary on the language.112 Other than Ahart’s 1975 examination of fee-shifting

105. See U.S. Patent Activity Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, U.S PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm [https://perma.cc
/VD49-VUK5] (showing an increase from less than 25,000 patents issued in 1946 to over
63,000 issued in 1982).
106. An examination of the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts in five-year increments from 1952 to 1982 showed increased activity
in patent cases filed before the district courts. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 126, tbl. C2 (1952) (525 cases); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 174, tbl. C2
(1957) (630 cases); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 197, tbl. C2 (1962) (752
cases); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 201, tbl. C2 (1967) (786 cases);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 286, tbl. C2 (1972) (857 cases);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 317, tbl. C2 (1977) (876 cases);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 215 tbl. C2 (1982) (836 cases).
107. E.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., Inc., 230 F.2d 855, 866 (4th Cir. 1956).
108. E.g., Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 263 F.2d 5, 28 (5th Cir.
1958).
109. E.g., Jacquard Knitting Mach. Co. v. Ordnance Gauge Co., 213 F.2d 503, 509 (3d Cir.
1954).
110. E.g., R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden’s Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 501 (3d Cir. 1956).
111. See, e.g., Q-Panel Co. v. Newfield, 482 F.2d 210 (10th Cir. 1973); Binks Mfg. Co. v.
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252, 260 (7th Cir. 1960); Turchan v. Cincinnati
Milling Mach. Co., 208 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1953).
112. See Richard L. Stroup, Patentee’s Monetary Recovery from an Infringer, 59 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 362, 401–04 (1977) (providing two and one-half page summary of § 285); Alfred
E. Wilson & Dwight A. Lewis, Elements of Recovery in a Patent Infringement Suit, 42 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 742, 756–71 (1960) (summarizing twelve cases that awarded fees and seventeen
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doctrine,113 the only other detailed analysis on the topic was a 1980 article in which
Rose and Rosenquist provided a comprehensive overview of the then-existing state
of case law on recovery of attorney fees in patent cases.114 They lamented the
“diversity of viewpoint” in the published cases, asserting (without citation) that
“[n]ot infrequently the very same act will receive opprobrium in one circuit,
approbation in another.”115 Although their extensive review of the extant case law
revealed some inconsistencies across the circuits,116 Rose and Rosenquist
acknowledged that the “diverse factual situations” underlying these cases mitigated
against the creation of “any specific formula” for evaluating attorney fee requests.117
They identified strong doctrinal consistency across the circuits as well, finding that
“more often than not an award of attorney fees is predicated on a multiplicity of acts
by one of the parties, which may or may not be related, but which the court considers
in toto to constitute bad faith.”118
In addition, the change in language from Section 70 to Section 285 had no effect
upon the exercise of judicial discretion by the trial courts. Awards remained firmly
within the realm of the trial courts.119 While the regional circuits continued to instruct
the district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether to
exercise their discretion to make attorney fee awards, they also continued to hold that
the trial court’s decision was not to be overturned absent an abuse of that
discretion.120 Examples of “exceptional” cases warranting the award of attorney fees
included those where the plaintiff’s device was clearly anticipated by a prior art
patent,121 where the plaintiff asserted positions repeatedly rejected by prior federal

cases that denied); Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 840, 854
(1960) (one paragraph summary of § 285). These were cited in Gerald Rose & John E.
Rosenquist, Attorneys’ Fees, 8 AIPLA Q. J. 66, 71 n.34 (1980); our search revealed no other
significant sources.
113. Ahart, supra note 64.
114. Rose & Rosenquist, supra note 112.
115. Id. at 71. They attributed this at least in part to the “absence of any Supreme Court
pronouncement” on the topic. Id.
116. For example, they summarized the outcomes in cases involving fraud on the Patent
Office thus: (1) almost all courts will award attorney fees where the conduct was actual fraud;
(2) many courts will award fees where there was deceptive intent but no actual fraud; and (3)
the courts divide on awarding fees where there was no deceptive intent but there was a material
nondisclosure or misrepresentation. Id. at 87–88.
117. Id. at 74.
118. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 74, 82.
119. See, e.g., True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 508–09 (10th Cir.
1979); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 597 (7th Cir. 1971);
Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 480–81 (8th Cir. 1965). In the words of the Ninth Circuit,
“This change in language certainly did not enlarge the judicial discretion of the trial judge;
neither did it take any portion away.” Florida Brace Corp. v. Bartels, 332 F.2d 337, 339 (9th
Cir. 1964).
120. See, e.g., Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 415 F.2d 373, 380 (2d Cir. 1969); Sarkes
Tarzian, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 351 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1965); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d
474, 479 (8th Cir. 1965).
121. See Lincoln v. Mademoiselle Fur Specialties Corp., 131 U.S.P.Q. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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courts,122 where the plaintiff’s excessive delay in bringing suit led to extensive
expenditures by the defendant in building its business and rendered it questionable
whether plaintiff had a bona fide belief in the validity of its patent,123 and where lack
of candor in answering interrogatories and a request for admissions indicated bad
faith conduct of litigation.124
In sum, thirty-five years of percolation in the regional circuits under Sections 70
and 285 resulted in a patent fee-shifting doctrine that was notably noncontroversial
and stable and that was grounded in the notion that bad-faith behavior or gross
injustice could warrant fee shifting. However, the creation of the Federal Circuit in
1982, and the consequent loss of percolation, sent patent fee-shifting doctrine down
a different path oriented less toward trial court discretion and more toward a
formulaic application of rules.
2. The Creation of the Federal Circuit and the End of Percolation: 1982–2014
The Federal Circuit was formed on October 1, 1982, and issued its first opinion
four weeks later, in which it adopted as binding precedent the holdings of its two
predecessor courts: the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals.125 However, the new court declared itself not bound by
the decisions of the regional circuit courts of appeals,126 as the patent doctrine of
those courts was often in conflict, and “resolution of conflict” was “a major element”
of the new court’s mission.127 The Federal Circuit thus indicated it would draw only
selectively upon the earlier body of precedent created by the regional circuits.128
Patent fee-shifting cases quickly came before the newly formed Federal Circuit. 129
Initially, the outcomes reached were consistent with the earlier cases decided by the
regional circuits. For example, the early Federal Circuit found “exceptional”
circumstances warranting attorney-fee awards where there was fraud in obtaining the
patent at issue, misconduct during litigation and assertion of infringement in bad

122. See Plymouth Rubber Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 203 F. Supp. 595 (D.
Mass. 1962), appeal dismissed, modified on other grounds, 321 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1963).
123. See Merry Hull & Co. v. Hi-Line Co., 243 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
124. See Kaehni v. Diffraction Co., 342 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1972), aff’d without op., 473
F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1973).
125. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (holding
that the predecessor courts’ precedents were binding provided those holdings had been issued
by those courts before the close of business on September 30, 1982).
126. Id. at 1371. Not all of the judges of the new court were comfortable with that stance.
A concurrence in an early Federal Circuit opinion warned of the dangers of ignoring the two
hundred years of regional circuit precedent. See Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 811
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (Nichols, J., concurring).
127. S. Corp., 690 F.2d at 1371.
128. See ROBERT L. HARMON, HARMON ON PATENTS: BLACK-LETTER LAW AND
COMMENTARY § 2.27(F), at 54–64 (2007).
129. See e.g., Hughes v. Novi Am., Inc., 724 F.2d 122 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rosemount, Inc.
v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984); CTS Corp. v. Piher Int’l Corp.,
727 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Stevenson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

60

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:39

faith;130 maintenance of a suit knowing the asserted patent was invalid;131 unfairness,
bad faith, or inequitable conduct by a patent owner bringing an unsuccessful
infringement action;132 and willful infringement on the part of the defendant.133 The
court also affirmed denials of attorney-fee awards in cases where a motion, though
unsuccessful, was not frivolous or brought only for harassment or delay134 or where
the defenses raised were not used in a vexatious or dilatory manner.135
In a decision rendered just a year and a half after the formation of the court—
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co.136—the Federal Circuit reviewed in
considerable detail the history of fee shifting generally under U.S. law. The court
there explained that even in the absence of a statutory provision, the courts had long
had the power to make an equitable award of attorney fees in “especially compelling”
circumstances, such as a party acting in contempt of court, bad-faith behavior by a
litigant, or the existence of a contractual agreement between the parties permitting
fee shifting.137 In addition, Congress has the legislative power to provide for fee
shifting. Statutory deviations from the American Rule, the Rohm & Haas court noted,
were often intended to “encourag[e] suits to vindicate congressional policy by
‘private attorneys general’” (e.g., as in the case of certain antitrust or environmental
statutes).138 However, the types of public policy-based concerns that underlie typical
statutory provisions for fee shifting make only a limited appearance in patent law,
arising largely in the context of fee shifting in favor of a party who successfully
invalidates a “fraudulent” patent.139 More commonly, fee shifting in the patent
context is intended to address private concerns of a litigant by preventing
“injustice.”140 Thus, the Rohm & Haas court asserted, previous decisions by the
regional circuits awarding attorney fees under Section 70 or Section 285 did so only

130. Hughes, 724 F.2d at 123–25.
131. Id. at 123–24.
132. See Stevenson, 713 F.2d 705.
133. See, e.g., Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
134. E.g., CTS Corp., 727 F.2d 1550.
135. E.g., Stickle, 716 F.2d 1550.
136. 736 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The opinion was written by Judge Giles Rich, a key
drafter of the 1952 Patent Act. It addressed an issue of first impression: does Section 285
authorize attorney fees for an exceptional appeal? Id. at 689–90. The court concluded “yes.”
Id. at 692.
137. Id. at 690 (citing MARY FRANCES DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED
ATTORNEY FEES ¶ 1.02 (1983)).
138. Id. (citing Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379; Clayton Act of
1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012)); Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2034 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d)
(2012))).
139. Id. at 692 (acknowledging the “frequently-cited policy considerations” underlying
such awards (citing True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 509 (10th Cir.
1979); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288,
294 (9th Cir. 1969))).
140. Id.
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in “extraordinary circumstances,”141 which included “willful and deliberate
infringement by an infringer” and “prolongation of litigation in bad faith.”142
One notable aspect of the Rohm & Haas analysis was the Federal Circuit’s easy
acceptance of the fee-shifting precedents created by the regional circuits prior to the
court’s formation in 1982. Although fee-shifting in patent cases was at that point
(and had been for almost four decades) statutory in nature,143 the doctrine still carried
equitable overtones that fostered flexible, fact-specific application of the doctrine
and that respected exercise of discretion by the trial court.
As the Federal Circuit matured over the next couple of decades, however, it forged
new paths for patent doctrine that deviated significantly from the pre-1982 doctrine
developed by the regional circuits. In particular, over time, the Federal Circuit
became prone to drafting bright-line rules, such as its “machine or transformation”
test for physical subject matter,144 its “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test for
nonobviousness,145 or its “general rule” that injunctive relief should be routinely
granted for patent infringement.146 The Supreme Court regularly rejected many of
these formulaic rules on appeal, demanding more nuanced approaches instead. 147 In
addition to this tendency toward bright-line rules, Federal Circuit decision-making
began showing a marked blurring between the role of appellate and trial courts, with
the Federal Circuit increasingly engaging in hyperactivity by stepping into territory

141. Id. at 691. The cases cited by the court all involved Section 70, however, suggesting
the court saw no difference between the doctrine applicable under the now-repealed Section
70 and the current Section 285. Id. at 691 n.5 (citing Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Rochester
Ropes, 199 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1952); Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137 (9th Cir.
1951); Laufenberg, Inc. v. Goldblatt Bros., 187 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951); Lincoln Elec. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 74 F. Supp. 293, 294 (N.D. Ohio 1947)).
142. Id. at 692 & n.7 (citing Milgo Elec. Co. v. United Bus. Commc’n, Inc., 623 F.2d 645
(10th Cir. 1980)). In 1990, the Federal Circuit further explained that “there is and should be
no difference in the standards applicable to patentees and infringers who engage in bad faith
litigation”; rather, the court noted, the “different interests” of those parties are accounted for
“in the required evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.” Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
143. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text (discussing enactment of Section 70 of
the Patent Act in 1946)
144. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958–59 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom., Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
145. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
146. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated &
remanded, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
147. See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604–05 (rejecting machine or transformation test); KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting teaching, suggestion, or
motivation test); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (rejecting
general rule of injunctive relief in favor of consideration of equitable factors). See generally
Dreyfuss, supra note 14; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit:
Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28 (2007);
Gugliuzza, supra note 1; Holbrook, supra note 9; Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s
Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1
(2003); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010); Thomas, supra
note 8.
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that had been reserved to the lower courts148 or even patent examiners.149 The Federal
Circuit also began ratcheting up the burden of proof in several contexts in the mid1980s.150
In the fee-shifting setting, the Federal Circuit’s formulaic tendencies came to a
head in 2005, in Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc.,151 where the
Federal Circuit adopted a new rule that radically restricted fee shifting under Section
285. Under the new, much more rigid rule of Brooks Furniture, fee shifting was
permitted in only two instances: (1) where there was material inappropriate conduct
related either to the litigation152 or to the securing of the patent,153 or (2) when the
litigation was both (a) “brought in subjective bad faith” and (b) “objectively
baseless.”154
The Brooks Furniture court also ruled that “the underlying improper conduct and
the characterization of the case as exceptional must be established by clear and
convincing evidence”155—a higher standard than the preponderance test that
typically applies in civil cases.156 Brooks Furniture did not create this heightened
burden of proof for showing exceptionality, however. Rather, the clear and
convincing evidence standard for Section 285 determinations can be traced back to
a 1985 opinion in which the young Federal Circuit adopted the heightened burden
for showing invalidity and inequitable conduct before the USPTO—a completely
different context—into the civil-litigation setting of fee-shifting doctrine.157 The net

148. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 20, at 726, 735–39 (defining “hyperactivity” and
arguing court improperly acted as an advocate when it considered on appeal arguments not
raised below or when it decided on appeal issues not properly preserved below); id. at 739–48
(arguing court improperly acted as a fact-finder when it found facts rather than remanding
after reversing the trial court or when it granted summary judgment to one party after reversing
the grant to the other party in the absence of a cross-motion for summary judgment).
149. Id. at 730–35 (arguing court improperly acted as a patent examiner when, while
engaging in claim construction, it relied upon patents not cited or considered by the patent
examiner or applicant).
150. See B.D. Daniels, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Litigation: A Critique, 36
AIPLA Q.J. 369, 408–10 (2008). Daniels also pointed to heightened standards of proof in
invalidity, inequitable conduct, and willful infringement cases.
151. 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
152. Id. at 1381. The court described such behavior as including “willful infringement,
fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious
or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or like infractions.” Id.
153. Id. (citations omitted). The court described this as “fraud or inequitable conduct in
procuring the patent.” Id.
154. Id. at 1382. In 2011, the Federal Circuit further clarified in iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc.,
631 F.3d 1372, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2011), that objectively baseless litigation is “so
unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed” and that subjective
bad faith litigation arises when the plaintiff “actually know[s]” that the litigation is objectively
baseless.
155. 393 F.3d at 1382 (citing Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d
1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
156. See Daniels, supra note 150, at 373 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423
(Fed. Cir. 1979)).
157. See Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (citing Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that
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result of the Federal Circuit’s narrow and inflexible formula and elevated burden of
proof for fee-shifting evaluations was that trial-court discretion was severely
curtailed and cases in which fee shifting under Section 285 occurred were few in
number and difficult to prove.158
The switch from the percolation-rich environment of the regional circuits to the
specialized setting of the Federal Circuit had profound effects upon the development
of patent fee-shifting doctrine. Doctrine became more uniform, of course (one of the
goals of court specialization159), but it also became undeniably more rigid and
formalistic. In 2014, the Supreme Court made it clear that the fee-shifting doctrine
created by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture was impermissibly divorced from
statutory mandates; it was, in short, wrong.
C. Octane Fitness and Highmark: Correcting the Course of Patent Fee-Shifting
Doctrine
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of
Section 285 in two paired cases: Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc.,160 and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc.161 Both
cases addressed the issue of correct fee-shifting doctrine from the perspective of the
proper role of courts in statutory interpretation. While the cases addressed different
aspects of the Federal Circuit’s fee-shifting doctrine under Section 285, together they
made a damning indictment of the Federal Circuit’s formalistic approach to fee
shifting in patent cases.
In a short opinion, Octane Fitness examined—and rejected—the Federal Circuit’s
narrow interpretation of “exceptional” in Section 285, finding that the Federal Circuit
had abandoned the previous “holistic, equitable approach” in applying Section 285
in favor of an incorrect “rigid and mechanical formulation”162 that “impermissibly
encumber[ed] the statutory grant of discretion” to the trial courts.163 The only
constraint that the statutory language places upon that discretion is that the case be
“exceptional.”164 Because the Patent Act itself does not define “exceptional,” the
Court drew upon standard canons of statutory construction in ruling that

fraud on the USPTO must be shown by clear and convincing evidence)). Challenges to the
validity of a patent remain subject to the clear and convincing evidence standard today. See
Microsoft Corp. v i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 94 (2011).
158. Professor Chien, for example, found that between 2005 and 2011, fee-shifting awards
were granted, on average, in 56 cases per year (out of 3000 patent cases filings, on average,
per year); slightly less than one-half of the awards went to prevailing defendants. Colleen V.
Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 325, 377 (2012).
159. See COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., supra note 5, at 28–
30 (discussing advantages of court specialization).
160. 572 U.S. 545 (2014).
161. 572 U.S. 559 (2014). While separate actions, these two cases were argued before the
Court on the same day (Feb. 26, 2014) and decided on the same day (April 29, 2014).
162. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 550.
163. Id. at 553.
164. Id.
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“exceptional” should be given its “ordinary meaning”165: a case “that stands out from
others with respect to” either (1) “the substantive strength of a party’s litigating
position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case)” or (2) “the
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”166 The Court noted, almost as
an aside, that the fee-shifting language in the Lanham and Patent Acts is identical,167
and it cited Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant,168 a 1985
decision from the D.C. Circuit written by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
joined by then-Judge Antonin Scalia.169 The Noxell court had found that
“exceptional,” for purposes of Lanham Act fee shifting, “is most reasonably read to
mean what the word is generally understood to indicate—uncommon, not run-of-themine.”170 The Supreme Court adopted the same commonsense definition of
“exceptional” for purposes of the Patent Act.171
The Octane Fitness Court then ruled that determinations of whether cases are
“exceptional” are to be made by the trial courts “in the case-by-case exercise of their
discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.”172 The Brooks Furniture
test was, the Court found, “overly rigid,”173 because it “superimpose[d] an inflexible
framework onto statutory text that [was] inherently flexible.”174 Although the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s standard for being overly formulaic,
the Court itself fell back a bit on formulaic standards by listing in a footnote the
“‘nonexclusive’ list of ‘factors’” that it had noted in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.175 and
that trial courts had considered in the past when applying a similar (but not identical)
fee-shifting provision under the Copyright Act:176 “frivolousness, motivation,

165. Id.
166. Id. at 554.
167. Id.
168. 771 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
169. Both of them of course had been elevated to the Supreme Court by the time of the
Octane Fitness decision. The court in Noxell had noted the “terse” and “thin” nature of the
legislative history underlying Section 1117(a), yet also emphasized that nothing in that
legislative history suggested an overly narrow reading of the grounds for fee recovery. Id. at
526; see also infra notes 230–37 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
Section 1117(a) of Lanham Act).
170. 771 F.2d at 526.
171. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554. However, the Supreme Court transcribed “run-ofthe-mine” to “run-of-the-mill” in quoting Noxell.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 555. The first category of cases listed in Brooks Furniture—those involving
certain types of misconduct—were largely categories of conduct that would be independently
sanctionable, which the Court found was too narrow a definition of exceptional.
“[U]nreasonable conduct,” even if not “independently sanctionable,” may be so exceptional
as to warrant fee shifting. Id. The second category was likewise too restrictive as the Court
found that either subjective bad faith or meritless claims might render a case exceptional; both
elements were not required. Id.
175. Id. at 554 n.6 (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994)).
176. The Copyright Act fee-shifting provision states: “Except as otherwise provided by
this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part
of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
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objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case)
and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation
and deterrence.”177 The Octane Fitness Court cautioned, however, that there was
“‘no precise rule or formula’” to be followed in Patent Act fee-shifting evaluations;
rather, these factors should guide the trial court’s exercise of “equitable
discretion.”178
The Court noted that the “demanding” standard of Brooks Furniture made Section
285 “largely superfluous.”179 The courts already have the inherent, common law
power to award attorney fees for “willful disobedience of a court order” or “when
the losing party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons.’”180 In two earlier cases in other contexts, the Court had declined to construe
fee-shifting statutes so narrowly as to make them superfluous, and it declined to do
so in the context of Section 285 as well.181
Having overruled the Federal Circuit’s standard for exceptionality, the Octane
Fitness Court turned to a second ground on which it reversed Federal Circuit
doctrine: the burden of proof for Section 285 determinations. Since 1985, Federal
Circuit precedent had required that a prevailing party show entitlement to attorney
fees by “clear and convincing evidence.”182 This, the Supreme Court noted, was not
supported by the language of Section 285 or by precedent addressing other feeshifting statutes.183 The “preponderance of the evidence standard” is the correct one
for most civil actions, including patent infringement litigation,184 as it enables both
litigants to “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.”185 In the absence of
legislative direction, the Federal Circuit had no basis for imposing this heightened
standard of proof for Section 285 claims.

177. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554 n.6 (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19).
178. Id. at 554 (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534). The Fogerty Court stated that prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants should be treated alike under the copyright fee-shifting provision,
and that awards were in the discretion of the trial court. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534. The Court
noted: “There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations, but instead
equitable discretion should be exercised in light of the considerations we have identified.” Id.
In a footnote, the Fogerty Court further explained that “[s]ome courts . . . have suggested
several nonexclusive factors to guide courts’ discretion. . . . These factors include
‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal
components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence.’” Id. at n.19 (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d
151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986)).
179. Octane Fitness 572 U.S. at 557.
180. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59
(1975)).
181. Id. (citing Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978) (fee shifting
under Title VII); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968) (per
curiam) (fee shifting under the Civil Rights Act of 1964)).
182. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
183. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 557 (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 557–58 (citation omitted).
185. Id. (citation omitted).
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In a short, unanimous opinion, Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management
System, Inc.,186 the Supreme Court followed up on the Octane Fitness holdings by
overruling the Federal Circuit on yet a third ground: the standard for review for
determinations of exceptionality under Section 285. Under Supreme Court
precedent, questions of law are reviewed de novo, questions of fact are reviewed for
“clear error,” and discretionary decisions are reviewed for “abuse of discretion.”187
The panel majority in Highmark found that a complicated, tri-part review standard
applied to Section 285 determinations. The objective baselessness standard of Brooks
Furniture was “a question of law based on underlying mixed questions of law and
fact” and thus was reviewed de novo.188 The subjective bad faith prong of Brooks
Furniture was to be reviewed for “clear error,”189 and the trial court’s ultimate
decision to award fees or not was to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.190 The
introduction of de novo review into the fee-shifting context was a sharp departure
from previous Federal Circuit precedent, which had recognized the unique role that
the trial court plays in such determinations because of its unparalleled familiarity
with the case.191 It did, however, fit into a larger pattern of the Federal Circuit
adopting de novo review for issues such as claim construction,192 willfulness,193
obviousness,194 and enablement,195 in contravention of prior precedent.
This issue proved divisive amongst the Federal Circuit judges. At the panel level,
Judge Mayer wrote a scathing dissent on the application of the de novo standard in
this context, in which he stated: “Our increasing infatuation with de novo review of
factual determinations began with claim construction, and has now infected review
of both willful infringement, and section 285 exceptional case determinations.”196
The Federal Circuit’s “overreaching,” he contended, had turned “litigation before the
district court [into] a mere dress rehearsal for the command performance” before the

186. 572 U.S. 559 (2014).
187. Id. at 563 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988)).
188. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
2012), vacated, 572 U.S. 559 (2014).
189. Id. at 1310.
190. Id. at 1322–23 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
191. See, e.g., Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977 F.2d 1555, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (“For fee-shifting issues particular deference is due to the trial judge, who had the
opportunity to observe those intangibles missing from the appellate record. The trial court is
in the best position to evaluate the conduct of the parties throughout the period of patent
infringement, and to allocate the burdens of litigation commensurate with the interest of
justice.”); see also Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(noting that the appellate court lacks the familiarity of the trial court with the details of the
litigation).
192. See e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
193. See e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L.Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
194. See e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
195. See e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
196. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1320 (Mayer, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 572 U.S. 559 (2014).
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appellate court.197 A request for rehearing en banc was denied in a six to five vote,198
with Judge Moore, writing for the dissent, arguing that the panel majority’s rule
“deviates from precedent, invades the province of the fact finder, and establishes a
review standard for exceptional case findings in patent cases that is squarely at odds
with the highly deferential review adopted by every regional circuit and the Supreme
Court in other areas of law.”199
On review, the Supreme Court noted that Octane Fitness, issued earlier the same
day, had established that not only does the clear language of Section 285 commit
determination of exceptionality to the discretion of the district court, but that the
district court “lives with the case over a prolonged period of time,”200 rendering it
better situated than the appellate court to make such a call.201 The Federal Circuit had
ignored the clear hierarchy of review standards set by Supreme Court precedents in
favor of an idiosyncratic rule that discounted the trial court’s role and heightened its
own appellate role. The Highmark Court held that the “abuse of discretion” standard
applied to review of “all aspects” of the trial court’s determinations on Patent Act fee
shifting.202
Octane Fitness and Highmark were a sharp rebuke to the Federal Circuit for:
(1) its overly rigid interpretation of statutory language; (2) imposition of an
inappropriately high standard of proof; and (3) overly intrusive review of
discretionary matters committed to the trial court by Congress. Although the feeshifting doctrine that emerged from the Federal Circuit was indeed uniform—one of
the goals of court specialization—it was also inaccurate and displayed precisely the
type of judicial hyperactivism scholars fear in this specialized court setting.203 One
would hypothesize, then, that the robust percolation found in Lanham Act feeshifting cases, while perhaps frustrating uniformity in the short term, would lead to
better doctrine in the long term. This is explored in the next Part.
III. PERCOLATION AND STATUTORY FEE SHIFTING UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
Statutory fee-shifting made a later appearance in the Lanham Act than it did in
the Patent Act. When it finally did arrive, in 1976, it used language identical to that
that had been adopted in Section 285 of the Patent Act in 1952. Unlike patent feeshifting doctrine, however, Lanham Act fee-shifting doctrine has percolated in the
regional circuits throughout its entire lifetime. This doctrine, at least at first glance,
evolved to be nonuniform in at least some respects. But did this nonuniformity
indicate a failure of percolation? This Part argues “no” because, as described below,
the core qualities necessary for appropriate fee-shifting decisions were maintained.

197. Id.
198. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (denial of petition for en banc review).
199. Id. at 1356 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of petition for en banc review).
200. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563–64 (2014)
(citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559–60 (1988)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (discussing Rooklidge & Weil, supra
note 20).
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A. The Origins of Fee Shifting in Trademark Law
Fee shifting in the trademark setting predates the Lanham Act. Congress enacted
the Lanham Act in 1946204—coincidentally, the same year in which Congress
adopted Section 70, the first patent fee-shifting statute. However, the Lanham Act,
like its predecessor trademark act,205 made no provision for fee shifting. After
Section 285 was adopted in the Patent Act of 1952, there were attempts to add the
same fee-shifting language to the Lanham Act, but those efforts failed.206
Despite the lack of statutory authority, a number of circuits had been allowing
recovery of attorney fees in egregious trademark cases via their common-law powers
for at least a few years prior to enactment of the Lanham Act. The seminal case is
widely regarded as a 1941 decision by the Seventh Circuit: Aladdin Manufacturing
Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America.207 The court there held that attorney fees could
be recovered as compensatory damages in trademark cases if there was “fraudulent
and wilful infringement” by the defendant.208 The court noted that general tort
damages are broadly defined so as to include “injury to business standing or good
will, loss of business, additional expenses incurred because of the tort and all other
elements of injury to the business.”209 Attorney fees, the court found, fell into this
grouping, and so could be awarded by the court as part of an overall tort
compensation package.210 Over the next twenty-six years, other courts granted or
upheld attorney fees in trademark cases, often with just summary analysis.211 In the

204. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427.
205. There had been attempts to enact federal trademark legislation in the late 1800s, which
did not survive constitutional challenge; these were followed by the Trademark Act of 1905,
ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 96, 99), amended by Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch.
104, 41 Stat. 533, which was widely regarded as defective. For a general history of the
development of federal trademark acts, see Sondra Levine, The Origins of the Lanham Act, 19
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22 (2010); Symposium, 50th Anniversary of the Lanham Act, 86
TRADEMARK REP. 353 (1996).
206. Senate Bill 2540, as amended, provided for recovery of attorney fees; it passed the
Senate but failed to pass the House of Representatives. See S. 2540, 83d Cong. § 25 (1954).
The Senate report accompanying the bill stated that the provision was intended to parallel the
recently enacted Section 285 of the Patent Act. See S. REP. NO. 83-2266, at 9 (1954). H.R.
7734, 84th Cong. § 25 (1955), had a similar provision, but failed in the Senate.
207. 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941) (allowing attorney fees as compensatory damages where
defendant’s conduct was willful and fraudulent); see also S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 5 (1974)
(“Prior to 1967, the courts in trademark infringement and unfair competition cases had
developed an equitable doctrine holding the attorney fees are recoverable by a successful
plaintiff, notwithstanding the absence of express statutory authority under the Lanham Act.”).
208. Aladdin, 116 F.2d at 716–17 (“Recoverable damages . . . include compensation for all
injury to appellant's business arising from wrongful acts committed by appellee, provided such
injury was the natural and proximate result of the wrongful acts.”).
209. Id. at 716 (citing 15 AM. JUR. §§ 133–36, 138).
210. Id.at 717.
211. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Nat’l Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1959); Maternally
Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956); Keller Prods. v.
Rubber Lining Corp., 213 F.2d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 1954); Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203
F.2d 517, 521 (2d Cir. 1953); Capitol Tie Rak, Inc. v. Tie Rack Stores, Inc., No. 63 C 1380
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words of the trial court in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Redlich in 1952: “There is
nothing novel in the concept of awarding the successful party attorney’s fees paid
and expenses incurred in litigation, stemming from the opponent’s fraudulent
conduct and but for which the litigation would have been avoided.”212
However, not all courts were comfortable with the notion of common-law fee
shifting in trademark cases. A 1951 district court opinion, Century Distilling Co. v.
Continental Distilling Corp., cautioned that “even if [the Aladdin] ruling is sound,
the discretion must be confined within the limits set by the almost uniform trend of
judicial decision, and is not to be exercised except in the most exceptional
circumstances.”213 The court found no such exceptional circumstances before it.214
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the denial of attorney fees, stating although it
was “arguable” that the trial court had the discretion to award attorney fees as costs,
there was no showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court that would warrant an
overturning of the denial of such fees.215 Similarly, in 1957, the district court in
Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing. Co. v. Davis Manufacturing. Co. declined to
award attorney fees.216 Although it did not address Aladdin specifically, the court
expressed skepticism with the idea of fee shifting generally in trademark cases. The
court noted that fee shifting was not authorized by the Lanham Act and that even if
a court of equity had the “inherent power” to award attorney fees in the absence of
statutory authorization, there was no evidence of “bad faith or vexatious tactics” that
would justify such an award in the case before it.217
The availability of common-law fee shifting in trademark cases came to a head in
1966, in a Ninth Circuit case captioned Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling
Corp.218 The court there held that attorney fees may not be awarded in Lanham Act
cases,219 finding that under a “long established principle,” the prevailing party cannot
recover attorney fees “in an ordinary action at law or in equity” absent a statutory or
contractual provision allowing the same.220 Not only did the Lanham Act not provide

1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7228, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 1966); Youthform Co. v. R.H. Macy &
Co., 153 F. Supp. 87, 95 (N.D. Ga. 1957); Francis H. Leggett & Co. v. Premier Packing Co.,
140 F. Supp. 328, 332 (D. Mass. 1956); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Singer Upholstering & Sewing
Co., 130 F. Supp. 205, 208 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
212. 109 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (emphasis omitted). The court characterized
the defendant’s behavior as “fraudulent, deliberate, wilful and wanton in the extreme” and
awarded attorney fees. Id.
213. 102 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
214. Id. (finding the plaintiff's behavior was “not innocent or inadvertett [sic],” but neither
was it “fraudulent”). As the court explained, “[t]here were no circumstances of palming off or
express malice, and no deliberate attempt to destroy the defendant's business. The worst that
can be said about the plaintiff's conduct is that it mistook its legal rights and stubbornly clung
to its ill-advised course of conduct after it became apparent that it would be wiser to give it
up.” Id.
215. Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir.
1953).
216. 149 F. Supp. 852, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
217. Id.
218. 359 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1966), aff’d, 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
219. Id. at 165.
220. Id. at 158.
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for attorney fees, but the fact that Congress provided for fee shifting in the Patent
Act the same year that it enacted the Lanham Act without fee shifting clearly
indicated that Congress knew how to provide for such recovery if it so chose—and
evidently it did not so choose in Lanham Act causes of action.221
What is perhaps most interesting about the Ninth Circuit’s discussion is its
implicit damning of the darker side of percolation. The court rejected the twentyfour-year-old reasoning of Aladdin, finding that it was, in effect, built upon nothing
more than smoke and mirrors and that it had “nothing to recommend it as authority
. . . except its age, if that be a recommendation.”222 The Ninth Circuit was disturbed
by what it deemed “a certain circularity in the judicial process” under which
common-law fee shifting in trademark law had evolved. Trademark fee-shifting
doctrine began with what the court called “a rather casual holding, citing no prior
authority” by the Seventh Circuit in Aladdin, which was then cited and followed
without discussion by the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits.223 The net result was
the inappropriate judicial creation of a doctrine permitting fee shifting in trademark
cases in the absence of congressional direction to allow such recovery.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co.224 to resolve the circuit split that ensued from the Ninth Circuit’s
holding. The Court affirmed, holding that fee shifting was not possible in the
trademark context because while the Lanham Act laid out an extensive and detailed
list of remedies, including injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and trebling of
damages in appropriate instances, fee shifting was not among them.225 Exceptions to
the American Rule, the Court stated, do not arise in “the context of statutory causes
of action for which the legislature ha[s] prescribed intricate remedies.”226 Thus, the
Court concluded, “[w]hen a cause of action has been created by a statute which
expressly provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies should
not be readily implied.”227 In addition, Congress had provided for attorney-fee
recovery in a number of other statutes, including enacting Section 70 of the Patent
Act the very same year the Lanham Act was enacted, and had considered but rejected
legislation providing for trademark fee shifting on several occasions.228 Under such
circumstances, the Fleishmann Court concluded, it would be “inappropriate” for the
courts to extend a remedy not found in the statute.229
Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court’s holding in Fleischmann. It
responded by adding fee-shifting language, Section 1117(a), to the Lanham Act in

221. Id. at 159.
222. Id. at 161.
223. Id. at 163.
224. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
225. See id. at 719–20.
226. Id. at 719.
227. Id. at 720. In his dissent, Justice Stewart concluded just the opposite, arguing that,
when it enacted the Lanham Act, Congress was aware of fee shifting under Aladdin, and chose
not to include fee shifting in the statute so as “to preserve the rule of that case.” Id. at 722
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 720–21, 720 n.16.
229. Id. at 721.
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1976.230 Section 1117(a) originated in House Bill 8981,231 which was introduced at
the behest of the Department of Commerce.232 The accompanying Senate report
stated that the purpose of the bill was to effect “three minor changes” to the federal
trademark statute, one of which was to “authorize award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party in trademark litigation where justified by equitable
considerations.”233 The Senate report further identified an imbalance in the federal
intellectual property laws: while the Patent and Copyright Acts permitted the
recovery of attorney fees in limited circumstances, the Lanham Act had no such
provision.234 The Senate Committee also agreed with the position of the Department
of Commerce that fee shifting in trademark cases “should be available in exceptional
cases, i.e., in infringement cases where the acts of infringement can be characterized
as ‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful.’”235 (These categories were to
play a significant role in later circuit precedents.)236 Recovery was to be available to
prevailing defendants in exceptional cases as well, to “provide protection against
unfounded suits brought by trademark owners for harassment and the like.”237
At the time that Congress addressed fee shifting in the trademark context, patent
law had had almost three decades of experience with statutory attorney fees awards.
It is not surprising, perhaps, that Congress adopted the same language in Section
1117(a) of the Lanham Act as it had enacted over twenty years earlier in Section 285
of the Patent Act: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party.”238
Because cases under the Lanham Act go to the regional appellate courts,239 twelve
regional circuits have had the opportunity to weigh in on what “exceptional” means
in this context, as opposed to the single specialized circuit court that has heard all
patent appeals post-1982. Percolation has thus been robust in the Lanham Act feeshifting arena. The net result, as demonstrated below, is that fee-shifting doctrine in
Lanham Act cases evolved in such a way as to be nonuniform, yet, as the next Section

230. Trademark Act, Pub. L. No. 93-600, § 3, 88 Stat. 1955, 1955 (1975). A previous bill,
Senate Bill 3452, was passed by the Senate in the Ninety-Second Congress but not addressed
by the House.
231. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1 (1974).
232. Id. at 2.
233. Id. at 1. The other two changes were (1) creating an automatic thirty-day extension
upon request for the filing of an opposition to a trademark registration application without
having to show good cause; and (2) eliminating the existing requirement that “reasons of
appeal” be filed with the USPTO when appealing from the USPTO to the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. Id.
234. Id. at 2.
235. Id.
236. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
237. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (quoting Department of Commerce statement). The Lanham
Act provision for fee shifting applies not only to violations of trademark rights, but to harmful,
false, or misleading advertising by a competitor as well, although those cases are significantly
fewer in number than the trademark cases. See Leighton, supra note 57, at 850. Nightingale
Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010), discussed in
the next Section, was, in fact, an advertising claim, not a trademark case.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012).
239. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); see also supra note 19 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
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demonstrates, it remained more true to legislative mandate than did the nonpercolated patent fee-shifting doctrine created by the Federal Circuit.
B. Lanham Act Fee-Shifting Doctrine in the Regional Circuits Pre-Octane Fitness
Statutory fee shifting under Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act started out on a
very different foot than did statutory fee shifting under the Patent Act. As noted
above, the legislative history of the Lanham Act listed four categories of infringing
acts by defendants that would justify fee awards to trademark owners—infringing
acts that could be labeled as “‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful”240—
as well as providing for awards to prevailing defendants where the trademark
owner’s wrongful behavior warranted it.241 By contrast, the legislative history of
Section 70 of the Patent Act set forth no such guiding principles, containing only a
broad reference to the prevention of “gross injustice.”242
Several early decisions under Section 1117(a) seized upon these four categories—
malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful acts—as though they were the
touchstones for determining whether a Lanham Act case was sufficiently exceptional
to support a fee award.243 Unless the infringement fell into one of these
classifications, the case was not exceptional and attorney fees were unavailable.
Although these decisions carry faint whiffs of the Federal Circuit’s formulaic
approach to fee shifting in patent cases, which was so sharply slapped down by the
Supreme Court in Octane Fitness in 2014, the approach of the regional circuits is
much more understandable in the Lanham Act context. Not only did the legislative
history specifically call out these behaviors as the types that would render a case
“exceptional,” the Senate report did so in a clause that was preceded by “i.e.” and
not “e.g.,”244 which might indeed lead a reader to infer that the labeled behaviors
were a closed set and not merely exemplars of the type of behavior that could justify
fee shifting.
The first three and half decades of Section 1117(a)’s existence saw a steady stream
of appellate decisions on fee shifting under the Lanham Act.245 As could be expected,

240. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2.
241. Id. at 6.
242. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
Section 70).
243. See, e.g., Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 746 (7th Cir.
1985); Incense v. Meadows, 692 F.2d 1048, 1052 (6th Cir. 1982); VIP Food, Inc. v. Vulcan
Pet, Inc., 675 F.2d 1106, 1107 (10th Cir. 1982); Tex. Pig Stands, Inc., v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l,
Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 696–97 (5th Cir. 1952). The Seventh Circuit stated that these four factors
formed a “canonical formula” for the circuits to follow. See Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door
Sys., 126 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases). Although most circuits listed
these factors in the disjunctive—“or”—as it appears in the initial part of the Senate report, S.
REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2, the Eleventh Circuit actually listed the factors in the conjunctive—
“and”—as the language appeared in the latter part of the report, id. at 5. See, e.g., St. Charles
Mfg. Co. v. Mercer, 737 F.2d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 1983); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of
Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 846 (11th Cir. 1983).
244. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2.
245. See, e.g., TE-TA-MA Truth Found.-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the
Creator, 392 F.3d 248 (7th Cir. 2004); Eagles, Ltd. v. Am. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724 (6th
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the robust percolation environment of the regional circuits, coupled with the
uncabined language of Section 1117(a) and sparse legislative history, led to divergent
language regarding the standard for exceptionality. In particular, the circuit courts
often explicitly discussed “bad faith” behavior in discussing what made a Lanham
Act case exceptional,246 harkening back to the common-law grounds for fee shifting
in trademark cases247 (and indeed, to the early days of Patent Act fee shifting as
well).248 The courts did not use consistent vocabulary in addressing the role of bad
faith. One court suggested that bad faith was a “shorthand” for the high degree of
culpability required under the four-factor inquiry suggested by the legislative
history.249 Some used “bad faith” as one of several factors to consider (i.e., was the
losing party’s claim “groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad
faith[?]”).250 A finding of bad faith acts was not considered a prerequisite to
recovery;251 rather, “something less” in terms of improper behavior would suffice.252
As the Ninth Circuit phrased it, bad faith might “be part of those exceptional
circumstances” that justify fee shifting, but “the mere absence of bad faith” would
not necessarily negate such an award.253
While one might anticipate that the regional circuit courts would reach out to the
substantial body of case law that had developed under Section 285 of the Patent Act
in determining what rendered a case “exceptional” given the legislative choice to
employ identical language in these two statutory provisions, patent case law played
a surprisingly small role in the development of Lanham Act doctrine. The Seventh
Circuit did recognize the parallel provisions in a 2004 case, and noted that under

Cir. 2004); Tamko Roofing Prods. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2002); People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001);
SecuraComm Consulting Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 1999); Pebble Beach
Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998); Post Office v. Portec, Inc., 913 F.2d 802
(10th Cir. 1990).
246. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2002);
Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985); Burndy
Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., 748 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1984); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway
Disc. Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1168 (11th Cir. 1982).
247. See supra notes 207–12 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Sections II.A, B.
249. Proctor, 280 F.3d at 527 (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526,
556 (5th Cir. 1998)).
250. Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Scott Fetzer Co. v. Williamson, 101 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 1996)); see also Hartman v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1987).
251. An exception appears to have been the Eleventh Circuit, which required a prevailing
defendant to show “bad faith” acts by the plaintiff, while requiring a prevailing plaintiff to use
the four factors listed in the legislative history. Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305,
1319 n.10, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001).
252. Ji v. Bose Corp., 626 F.3d 116, 129 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l
Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F. 3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000);
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2000); Door Sys.,
Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 126 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1997); Noxell Corp. v.
Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 525–26 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
253. Stephen W. Boney, Inc., 127 F.3d at 827 (citations omitted).
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Supreme Court precedent, “similar language” in fee-shifting statutes “is ‘a strong
indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.”254 The court concluded that as cases
under the Patent Act had been deemed exceptional where the losing party had
“engaged in vexatious litigation conduct,”255 a prevailing plaintiff could be awarded
fees under the Lanham Act “where the defendant’s litigation conduct was
oppressive.”256 The Third Circuit noted that Section 285 case law did not require
willful behavior to support fee shifting under the Patent Act and determined that
Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act should follow suit.257 Generally, though, the
regional circuits paid little attention to the similarity of the two provisions.
The variations in language employed by the circuit courts in interpreting Section
1117(a) attracted the attention of a few courts and commentators.258 In particular, in
2010, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit addressed the various approaches of the
circuits in an opinion captioned Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne
Therapy, LLC.259 He there attempted to categorize and summarize the then-existing
interpretations of “exceptional” in the context of Lanham Act fee shifting across the
various circuits before setting forth yet an even different standard for the Seventh
Circuit. In so doing, he painted an unfavorable, yet not entirely accurate, picture of
the effects of percolation on the uniformity (or lack thereof) in Lanham Act feeshifting doctrine.
According to Judge Posner’s analysis, four circuits—the Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and
D.C. Circuits—adopted different tests based upon whether the plaintiff or the
defendant prevailed.260 In the Fourth and D.C. Circuits, a prevailing plaintiff was
required to show the infringement was willful or in bad faith, while a prevailing
defendant could show “‘something less than bad faith’ by the plaintiff.”261 The Tenth
Circuit required a prevailing plaintiff to show bad faith (but apparently did not
consider willfulness), but, like the Fourth and D.C. Circuits, imposed a lower
standard for a prevailing defendant (albeit phrased differently than the test imposed

254. TE-TA-MA Truth Found.-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 392
F.3d 248, 392 F.3d 248, 261 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v.
Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 759 n.2 (1989)); accord CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979
F.2d 60, 65 (5th Cir. 1992).
255. TE-TA-MA Truth Found.-Family of URI, 392 F.3d at 262 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec,
Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 831 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
256. Id. at 263; see also Int’l Olympic Comm. v. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 739
(9th Cir. 1986) (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974)) (ruling on role of willfulness in fee
awards).
257. Securacomm, 224 F.3d 273, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2000).
258. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc.,
223 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958
F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1992); Anne M. Mellen, Case Note, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees Under the
Lanham Act: Egregious Litigation Conduct in the “Exceptional” Case, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
1111 (2006).
259. 626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010).
260. Id. at 960.
261. Id. (such as “economic coercion, groundless arguments, and failure to cite controlling
law” (citing Retail Servs. Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g, 364 F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir. 2004); Reader’s
Digest Ass’n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 808–09 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).
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by those other circuits).262 The Sixth Circuit referred back to the “canonical formula”
found in the legislative history263 and relied upon by early courts264 in maintaining
that the prevailing plaintiff had to show the infringement was “malicious, fraudulent,
willful, or deliberate,” while a prevailing defendant had to show the suit was
“oppressive.”265
The Nightingale analysis stated that three circuits—the Second, Fifth, and
Eleventh—required that the prevailing party, whether defendant or plaintiff, show
that the opponent litigated in bad faith or, if the defendant prevailed, that the suit was
fraudulent.266 The First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits did not require a showing
of bad faith267 but articulated a variety of other standards. The First Circuit, for
example, stated that a showing of “‘willfulness short of bad faith or fraud [would]
suffice when equitable considerations justify an award’” and the lower court
adequately supported its finding of exceptionality.268 The Third Circuit required a
showing of “culpable conduct on the part of the losing party,” but noted that that
conduct could take “‘a variety of forms’” and could vary depending upon the specific
circumstances of a case.269 The Ninth Circuit stated that while bad faith may suffice,
“‘other exceptional circumstances’” could also justify an award,270 although a later
case added the gloss that “exceptional” meant that “the defendant acted maliciously,
fraudulently, deliberately, or willfully” (the four factors from the legislative history)
or that the plaintiff’s case was “groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in
bad faith.”271

262. Id. (requiring one of four showings: (1) bad faith in bringing the suit; (2) “lack of any
foundation” for the suit; (3) “unusually vexatious and oppressive” prosecution of the suit; or
(4) “perhaps for other reasons as well” (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, 223
F.3d at 1147)). According to Judge Posner, the breadth of the fourth factor meant the Tenth
Circuit could “hardly be said to have a test.” Id.
263. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
265. Nightingale, 626 F.2d at 960 (citing Eagles, Ltd. v. Am. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724,
728 (6th Cir. 2004)).
266. Id. at 960–61 (citing Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 221–22
(2d Cir. 2003); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 527–28 (5th Cir. 2002);
Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001); Tire Kingdom, Inc. v.
Morgan Tire & Auto, Inc., 253 F.3d 1332, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). The Fifth
Circuit added the gloss that in evaluating a prevailing defendant’s request for attorney fees,
the court should “consider the merits and substance of the civil action when examining the
plaintiffs’ good or bad faith.” Procter & Gamble, 280 F.3d at 528.
267. Nightingale, 626 F.3d at 961.
268. Id. (quoting Tamko Roofing Products, Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st
Cir. 2002)).
269. Id. (quoting Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 280 (3d
Cir. 2000)).
270. Id. (quoting Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Services, Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
271. Id. (quoting Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 615 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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The Nightingale court ultimately adopted yet a different test for Lanham Act fee
shifting: the “abuse of process” standard. This standard defined an “exceptional” case
under the Lanham Act as one in which:
the losing party was the plaintiff and was guilty of abuse of process in
suing, or . . . the losing party was the defendant and had no defense yet
persisted in the trademark infringement . . . for which he was being sued,
in order to impose costs upon his opponent.272
If the Nightingale court’s goal was to bring uniformity to the Lanham Act feeshifting doctrine, it failed. No other circuit has considered, much less adopted, the
Seventh Circuit’s “abuse of process” standard. Only one, the Eighth Circuit, has even
cited Nightingale’s summary of the circuit courts’ approaches.273
If the Nightingale court’s goal was simply to illustrate unacceptable schisms in
doctrine as a result of percolation through the regional circuits, it likewise failed.
Judge Posner engaged in meticulous parsing of the regional circuits’ precedents to
argue that percolation led to a fragmented, incorrect doctrine. In trying to explain the
resultant disarray in Lanham Act fee shifting across the various circuits, he turned to
the concept of “circuit drift”: “the heavy caseloads and large accumulations of
precedent in each circuit induce courts of appeal to rely on their own ‘circuit law,’
as if each circuit were a separate jurisdiction rather than all being part of a single
national judiciary enforcing a uniform body of federal law.”274
Did percolation hinder the formation of consistent Lanham Act fee-shifting
doctrine? This is unclear. Circuit differences in doctrine are an expected consequence
(and some would argue major benefit) of percolation and ought not to be regarded as
suspect in and of themselves.275 As Judge Posner himself pointed out, we can point
to the many different articulations of fee-shifting doctrine used by the circuits in
Lanham Act cases and identify linguistic variations and disparities, but it is very
difficult to sort out whether these differences in language lead to a difference in
outcomes.276 Attorney fee awards are based on factual circumstances best known by
(and perhaps at times even known only to) the trial court judge who lives with the
case, often for years. It is virtually impossible to evaluate how much, if any,
difference the various regional circuit iterations of the Lanham Act fee-shifting
doctrine made in actual outcomes because of the difficulty in finding identical fact
patterns in different circuits that would allow accurate comparisons of outcomes.
Although accuracy of outcomes is hard to evaluate, accuracy of doctrine is easier
to assess. As the next Section demonstrates, Lanham Act fee-shifting doctrine,

272. Id. at 963–64.
273. Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit continued to apply its own previous standard of
exceptionality that required actions that were “groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued
in bad faith.” Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 650 F.3d 1139, 1152 (8th Cir.
2011); see also Cmty. Christ Copyright Corp. v. Devon Park Restoration Branch of Jesus
Christ’s Church, 634 F.3d 1005, 1013 (8th Cir. 2011) (same).
274. Nightingale, 626 F.3d at 962.
275. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
276. Nightingale, 626 F.3d at 962 (“To decide whether the standards differ more than
semantically would require a close study of the facts of each case.”).
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despite its percolation-engendered nonuniformities, was demonstrably more
consistent with the Court’s three edicts in Octane Fitness and Highmark than was
the patent fee-shifting doctrine developed by the specialized Federal Circuit. As
discussed below, less correction was necessary and the overall direction of the
trademark case law did not shift significantly following the two Supreme Court
cases.
C. Lanham Act Fee-Shifting Doctrine in the Regional Circuits Post-Octane Fitness
As discussed above, the Supreme Court made three key rulings in Octane Fitness
and Highmark: (1) determinations of exceptionality, which is defined by its “ordinary
meaning,” are to be made by the trial court in a case-specific exercise of discretion
based on the totality of the circumstances;277 (2) evidence of exceptionality need only
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence;278 and (3) the trial court’s decisions
regarding exceptionality are subject to review for abuse of discretion and not de
novo.279 These errors in Patent Act fee-shifting doctrine had evolved under the
Federal Circuit’s specialized jurisdiction and were not products of the percolating
patent doctrine that applied prior to formation of the court in 1982.
Despite recognizing the identical language of the two statutory provisions and
citing a Lanham Act case, Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant,280
the Supreme Court did not address whether its analyses of fee shifting under Section
285 of the Patent Act also applied to fee shifting under Section 1117(a) of the
Lanham Act. However, since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Octane Fitness and
Highmark, every circuit except the Tenth and the D.C. Circuits has had the
opportunity to address fee shifting under the Lanham Act. Every one of those circuits
except the Seventh Circuit has determined that the Octane Fitness standard for
exceptionality should apply to Lanham Act fee shifting as well,281 given the “clear
guidance” of the Court in the context of Section 285 as well as “the parallel purpose,

277. See supra notes 162–78 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 186–202 and accompanying text.
280. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 555 (2014) (citing
Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 525–26 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
281. See Sleepy’s, LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp., 909 F.3d 519 (2d Cir. 2018);
Sturgis Motorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photos & Gifts, Inc., 908 F.3d 313 (8th Cir. 2018);
Scholz v. Goudrea, 901 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2018); Tobinik v. Novella, 884 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir.
2018); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 866 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Second
Circuit precedent); Sunearth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., 839 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016)
(en banc) (per curiam); Baker v. DeShong, 821 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2016); Georgia-Pac.
Consumer Prods., L.P. v. Von Drehle Corp., 781 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 2015); Slep-Tone Entm’t.
Corp. v. Karaoke Kandy Store, Inc., 782 F.3d 313 (6th Cir. 2015); Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v.
Dempster, 764 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2014). In its single post-Octane Fitness examination of
Lanham Act fee-shifting, the Seventh Circuit applied its 2010 abuse of process standard
without reference to the Supreme Court’s ruling. Burford v. Accounting Practice Sales, Inc.,
786 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2015). Although the issue has not yet arisen in the D.C. Circuit postOctane Fitness, we can assume little or no change in precedent is required in that circuit as its
Noxell opinion formed part of the basis for the Supreme Court’s reasoning. See supra notes
168–71 and accompanying text.
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structure, and language” of the two sections.282 By comparing Lanham Act feeshifting doctrines to these three rulings, we can get a sense of whether percolation
results in more accurate legal doctrine than does uniform doctrine developed by a
specialized court. Our analysis indicates that while the regional circuits were required
to make adjustments to their exceptionality doctrines post-Octane Fitness, those
revisions were relatively minor. Moreover, their doctrines already conformed to the
Supreme Court’s rulings on the burden of proof and standard of review applicable
under the statutory language.
First, in the ten regional circuits that have reviewed and adopted for purposes of
Section 1117(a) the Supreme Court’s definition of “exceptional” under Section 285,
we do see some shifts in the standards, largely based on rolling back the role of “bad
faith” in determining exceptionality. “Bad faith” played a prominent, if not
necessarily determinative, role in most circuits’ Lanham Act fee-shifting doctrine
pre-Octane Fitness.283 In Octane Fitness, however, the Supreme Court made it clear
that a case could be exceptional even if misbehavior of “less than bad faith” was
involved.284 As a result, the circuit courts had to reassess and recalibrate their
Lanham Act fee-shifting doctrines.
This did not require radical doctrinal change. In one of the earliest appellate cases
to address this topic post-Octane Fitness, Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,285 the
Third Circuit found that its previous fee-shifting standard had to be “slightly altered”
to satisfy the Supreme Court’s holding.286 Under prior Third Circuit precedent, the
trial court first determined whether the defendant had engaged in “any culpable
conduct,” which included, in a nonexclusive list, “bad faith, fraud, malice, and
knowing infringement.”287 If the trial court found culpable conduct on the part of the
losing party, the court would then consider whether the circumstances were
sufficiently “exceptional” to support a fee award.288 The Third Circuit found that
after Octane Fitness, it was inappropriate to “cabin” the trial court’s discretion by
imposing a “threshold requirement that the losing party acted culpably;”289 rather,
Supreme Court analysis made clear that “exceptionally meritless claims” may also
warrant fee shifting.290 The Third Circuit’s precedent was thus too restrictive and
could not stand.

282. Baker, 821 F.3d at 624 (citing Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d 303); see also Ballero v.
727 Inc., 774 F. App’x 871 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Sunearth, Inc., 839 F.3d at 1180
(citing Georgia-Pac. Consumer Prods., 781 F.3d at 720).
283. See supra notes 246–53 and accompanying text.
284. Octane-Fitness, 572 U.S. at 555 (“[W]e think it fair to assume that Congress did not
intend rigidly to limit recovery of fees by a [Lanham Act] defendant to the rare case in which
a court finds that the plaintiff ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons’ . . . . Something less than ‘bad faith,’ we believe, suffices to mark a case as
‘exceptional.’” (quoting Noxell, 771 F.2d at 526) (alterations in original)).
285. 764 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2014).
286. Id. at 315.
287. Id. at 314.
288. Id. (citing Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2007)).
289. Id. at 315.
290. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 555. Culpability might influence the trial court’s analysis
of exceptionality, but it was no longer a mandatory first step in evaluating a fee-award request.
Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 315.
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Several other circuits likewise found that their standards needed revising to
diminish the role of bad faith in Lanham Act fee shifting post-Octane Fitness. The
Second Circuit abandoned its precedents requiring actions such as “‘evidence of
fraud or bad faith’” or whether the lawsuit “was ‘initiated as a competitive ploy’” or
begun “‘in bad faith merely to join in the profits from [the defendant].’”291 The
Fourth Circuit found that, post-Octane Fitness, the losing party’s actions “need not
have been independently sanctionable or taken in bad faith” to support a finding of
exceptionality.292 The Fifth Circuit held that there could no longer be “a rigid
standard of culpable conduct” or a requirement of bad faith.293 The Eighth Circuit
had previously defined exceptional cases as those involving acts that were
“groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.”294 When the issue
arose before it in 2018, the Eighth Circuit abrogated that stance and simply adopted
the Octane Fitness standard instead.295
In addition to abandoning any requirement that the trial court find certain types of
impermissible behavior, the regional circuit courts embraced the Octane Fitness
Court’s emphasis on allowing the trial court to fully exercise the discretion granted
to it by Congress when making exceptionality determinations. The Ninth Circuit’s
approach in its 2016 en banc, per curiam opinion in Sunearth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar
Power Co.296 is typical. The court noted that it historically had ruled that
“exceptional,” within the meaning of fee shifting under the Lanham Act, required
“‘malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful’ infringement” by defendant.297 Those
qualifiers were now discarded and district courts in the Ninth Circuit were directed
to examine the “totality of the circumstances” in gauging exceptionality—exercising
their “equitable discretion”—in accordance with the Octane Fitness holding. 298 In
doing so, the district courts should apply the Octane Fitness standard that an
“exceptional case” under the Lanham Act is one that “stands out from others,” either

291. Sleepy’s LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp., 909 F.3d 519, 530 (2d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1383 (2d Cir. 1993);
Universal City Studios v. Nintendo Co., 797 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1986); Mennen Co. v. Gillette
Co., 565 F. Supp. 648, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1437 (2d Cir. 1984)) (alterations
in original).
292. Verisign, Inc. v. XYZ.com LLC, 891 F.3d 481, 487-88 (4th Cir. 2018).
293. Baker v. DeShong, 821 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 2016).
294. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 650 F.3d 1139, 1152 (8th Cir. 2011).
295. Sturgis Motorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc., 908 F.3d 313, 346
(8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554). A few weeks later, in a short
decision, the Eighth Circuit cited to the adoption of the Octane Fitness standard in Sturgis
Motorcycle Rally, Inc. in its decision in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus. Inc., 912 F.3d
445, 454 (8th Cir. 2018), but the court also quoted a 1987 precedent that defined an exceptional
case as one “in which a plaintiff brought an action that ‘was groundless, unreasonable,
vexatious, or was pursued in bad faith.’” Id. (quoting Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833
F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1987)).
296. 839 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam).
297. Id. at 1180 (quoting Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1409 (9th Cir.
1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218). The court also noted that the district court’s decision had been
reviewed de novo under prior precedent. Id.
298. Id. at 1180–81 (citing Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554).
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based on the strength of the litigating positions or the manner in which the case was
litigated.299
One unintended consequence has arisen from the Supreme Court’s citation in
Octane Fitness of the Fogerty factors considered by the courts in evaluating fee
shifting under the Copyright Act: “frivolousness, motivation, objective
unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need
in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence.”300 The Court’s listing of those factors in Octane Fitness is curious, as
the fee-shifting language of the Copyright Act301 does not parallel that of the Patent
and Lanham Acts; in particular, it is not limited to “exceptional” cases. Even the
Supreme Court, it would seem, is not immune to the ease and allure of multifactor
guidelines. The concern, of course, is that such guidelines may morph into mandatory
tests. By listing these factors in Octane Fitness, the Court opened the door to the
same type of formulaic approach that it had rejected in the Federal Circuit’s
jurisprudence under the Patent Act.
And indeed, several circuits seized upon the Fogerty factors as a useful, and
perhaps even required, roadmap in evaluating Lanham Act fee shifting in postOctane Fitness cases. The Ninth Circuit directed the trial court to exercise its
“equitable discretion in light of the nonexclusive factors identified in Octane Fitness
and Fogerty.”302 The Second Circuit recited these factors and indicated that it had
some doubt as to whether the case at hand was “‘frivolous[]’ or improperly
‘motivat[ed],’” and so sent it back down to the trial court for evaluation on these
grounds.303 The First Circuit found that the trial court had not abused its discretion
in denying an award of attorney fees, noting that the trial court had not only cited the
Fogerty factors but had “also thoughtfully analyzed each of those factors.” 304 The
First Circuit did not go so far as to state that a trial court must employ those factors
in making a determination of exceptionality under the trademark statute, but it is
clear that its use of the factors persuaded the appellate court there had been no abuse
of discretion.305 The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, created a “three-part test”306 for

299. Id. at 1080; see also Scholz v. Goudrea, 901 F.3d 37, 49–50 (1st Cir. 2018); Tobinick
v. Novella, 884 F.3d 1110, 1118 (11th Cir. 2018); Slep-Tone Entmt’t v Karaoke Kandy Store,
Inc., 782 F.3d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 2015); Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,
315 (3d Cir. 2014).
300. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554 n.6 (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,
534 n.19 (1994)).
301. See supra note 176 (quoting Copyright Act fee-shifting language).
302. Sunearth, 839 F.3d at 1181 (emphasis in original).
303. Sleepy’s LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp., 909 F.3d 519, 531 n.7 (2d. Cir.
2016) (alterations in original).
304. Scholz, 901 F.3d at 50.
305. Id.
306. Exclaim Mktg., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 674 F.App’x 250, 260 (4th Cir. 2016).
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evaluating Lanham Act fee shifting that was an amalgamation of Octane Fitness and
the Fogerty factors,307 thus cementing Fogerty into its Lanham Act jurisprudence.
In short, the regional circuits did have to adjust their Lanham Act fee-shifting
doctrines after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Octane Fitness to comply with its
mandates. Even after those adjustments, their doctrines do not fully align but rather
display some variation. These adjustments and variations are relatively minor,
however, and do not display the gross departure from statutory language and
legislative intent that the Supreme Court chastised the Federal Circuit for in the
Patent Act context. In this sense, we can indeed say that percolating Lanham Act
doctrine was “more correct” than the isolated doctrine developed by the specialized
Federal Circuit.
Second, the regional circuits’ handling of the burden of proof issue was also
demonstrably more correct in the Lanham Act setting than was the Federal Circuit’s
approach in the Patent Act setting. In civil cases, the preponderance of the evidence
standard generally applies in the absence of legislative direction to the contrary.308
The Federal Circuit nonetheless imposed a heightened clear-and-convincingevidence standard, which the Octane Fitness Court overturned as being contrary to
Section 285’s language and legislative history.309 In stark contrast, we can find no
evidence that the regional circuits deviated from the norm of the preponderance
standard when evaluating fee-shifting requests under Section 1117(a) of the Lanham
Act.310 On this matter, we can confidently state that the regional circuits got the
doctrine right while the Federal Circuit got it wrong.
Third, the Highmark Court had overturned the Federal Circuit’s attempt to import
a de novo review standard into Section 285 fee shifting for purposes of its “objective
baselessness” prong of Brooks Furniture. The Court ruled that whether a case is
exceptional is a matter of discretion and thus “all aspects” of the trial court’s
determination are reviewable only for abuse of discretion.311 During the thirty-six
years that Patent Act fee shifting percolated among the regional courts, the
controlling review standard was indeed a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard;312

307. Georgia-Pac. Consumer Prods., L.P. v. Von Drehle Corp., 781 F.3d 710 (4th Cir.
2015). The Fourth Circuit stated that the trial court could deem a case so “exceptional” as to
warrant an attorney fee award if “in light of the totality of the circumstances” it finds:
(1) “there is an unusual discrepancy in the merits of the positions taken by the
parties,” based on the non-prevailing party’s position as either frivolous or
objectively unreasonable; (2) the non-prevailing party “has litigated the case in
an ‘unreasonable manner;’” or (3) there is otherwise “the need in particular
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”
Id. at 721 (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554
n.6 (2014); Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 2014)). The first
two parts draw on the Octane Fitness standard; the third is selected from the Fogerty factors.
308. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
309. Octane-Fitness, 572 U.S. at 557 (discussed supra notes 182–85 and accompanying
text).
310. Most simply did not discuss it, but none overtly used the clear-and-convincingevidence standard.
311. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 (2014).
312. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 667 F.2d 577, 584 (7th Cir. 1981); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, GmbH, 625 F.2d 580, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1980);
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it was only under the specialized jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit that the standard
was ratcheted up and divided into a complex, three-part standard of review.313
We do not see the same distortion of review standards in the Lanham Act feeshifting arena. Prior to Highmark, all circuits but the Ninth agreed that the
determinations of whether a particular case was exceptional and if so, whether fee
shifting was appropriate under the circumstances, were discretionary determinations
entitled to deference.314 The Fifth Circuit—but it would appear only the Fifth—
applied the intermediate “clear error” standard to the determination of whether a case
was exceptional.315 All agreed that whether fees were warranted under the particular
circumstances of a case found to be exceptional was reviewable only for abuse of
discretion.316 The Ninth Circuit stood alone in applying de novo review to the
exceptionality determination, though it too applied the abuse of discretion standard
to the determination to award or deny attorney fees in an exceptional case.317 Thus,
Highmark changed legal doctrine only in the Ninth Circuit.318 The rest of the circuits
ignored the decision as, in effect, they were already in compliance with it.319 In this
area too, we can confidently state that the regional circuits got doctrine right while
the Federal Circuit got it wrong.
So where does all this parsing of case law leave us in our quest to understand the
role that percolation versus specialization plays in doctrinal development of fee

Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1977);
Norton Co. v. Carborundrum Co., 530 F.2d 435, 445 (1st Cir. 1976); Orrison v. C. Hoffberger
Co., 190 F.2d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 1951); Dubil v. Rayford Camp & Co., 184 F.2d 899, 903 (9th
Cir. 1950); Blanc v. Spartan Tool Co., 168 F.2d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1948).
313. See supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s tripart standard).
314. Several circuit courts noted that the meaning of “exceptional” under the Lanham Act
was a legal one subject to de novo review, see, e.g., Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551
F.3d 65, 81 (1st Cir. 2008); TE-TA-MA Truth. Found.-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church
of the Creator, 392 F.3d 248, 257 (7th Cir. 2004); Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc.
v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 2000); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v.
Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1991), which is consistent with general norms of
statutory interpretation and Highmark. See Highmark, 572 U.S. at 563.
315. See, e.g., Nat’l Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 F.3d 526, 537 (5th
Cir. 2012). This is the standard that had been adopted by the Federal Circuit for determinations
of exceptionality under Section 285 by the mid-2000s. See, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar
Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 528 F.3d
1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
316. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank in Sioux Falls v First Nat’l Bank S.D., 679 F.3d 763, 771
(8th Cir. 2012); Ji v. Bose Corp., 626 F.3 116, 129 (1st Cir. 2010); TE-TA-MA Truth. Found.,
392 F.3d at 257; Lipscher v. LRP Pub’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2001);
Securacomm Consulting, Inc v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n
of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1146; Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 503 (6th
Cir. 1998); Goodheart Clothing Co. v. Laura Goodman Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 268, 272 (2d
Cir. 1992); Garrett Corp. v. Am. Safety Flight Sys., Inc., 502 F.2d 9, 22 (5th Cir. 1974).
317. See Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., 668 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 2012).
318. See Sunearth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., 839 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc) (per curiam).
319. See, e.g., Premium Balloon Access, Inc. v. Creative Balloons Mfg., 573 F. App’x.
547, 558 (6th Cir. 2014).
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shifting? It is true that we saw some variation in regional circuit doctrine pre-Octane
Fitness—and we still see strands of nonuniformity post-Octane Fitness. However,
some variation in doctrine under percolation is to be expected; in fact, one of the
perceived advantages of percolation is just that sort of testing of doctrine and rules.320
The next Part explores these issues.
IV. LEARNINGS FROM THE PERCOLATION “EXPERIMENT”
The doctrinal history of fee shifting provides a rich setting for understanding the
role of percolation, a concept that was previously assessed only in theory. We believe
the presence of identical statutory language in two highly related areas of law serves
as a uniquely reliable grounding for a number of insights. These are particularly
relevant for understanding the way in which percolation shapes statutory
interpretation and fosters the primacy of legislative intent. In addition, we observe
that this natural experiment remains ripe for further empirical analysis, potentially
yielding more granular observations.321
At core, the comparison of Lanham Act and Patent Act fee-shifting cases provides
real evidence that percolation does in fact have an impact on doctrine. Fee-shifting
doctrine in the patent context from 1946 (when the first fee-shifting statute was
enacted) to 1982 passed through multiple circuits and yet resulted in unexpectedly

320. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (summarizing Estreicher & Sexton’s
analysis of the benefits of percolation).
321. Octane Fitness and Highmark led to an immediate increase in the number of attorney
fee requests being made and the percentage of such requests being granted under the Patent
Act. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: ARE WE AT AN INFLECTION
POINT 7 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2016-pwc
-patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNB6-KCNN] (finding that in the 16 months
preceding Octane Fitness, there were 69 fee-shifting requests, 26% of which were granted; in
the 20 months following, there were 144 requests, 41% of which were granted); see also Scott
M. Flanz, Octane Fitness: The Shifting of Patent Attorneys’ Fees Moves into High Gear, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 329 (2016); W. Keith Robinson, Essay, Awarding Attorney Fees and
Deterring Patent Trolls, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 281 (2016).
Practitioners have argued that Octane Fitness has not had an appreciable impact on
the grant or denial of attorney-fee awards under the Lanham Act. One pair of commentators
argued that district courts are largely awarding fees under Octane Fitness’ second factor (the
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated) in circumstances that would have
warranted attorney fees under the previous standard (e.g., “sanctionable conduct, unjustified
litigating tactics, and fraud”), leading to no real change. Kevin R. Miller & Brian M. Block,
Collecting Attorneys’ Fees Under the Lanham Act: The Shifting Definition of an “Exceptional
Case,” 12 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 30, 36 (2015). Another trio of practitioners noted that in
some circuits, there was no real appreciable change in the underlying standard post-Octane
Fitness, and so no change in outcomes would be expected there. Bryan Wheelock, Kara
Fussner & Daisy Manning, The Award of Attorneys’ Fees in Exceptional Cases Under 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a) of the Lanham Act, 106 TRADEMARK REP. 1011, 1035 (2016). They predicted,
however, that in those circuits that had previously applied a bad-faith standard, the number of
fee awards will increase over time as the standard for receiving same is now lower. Id. There
is now sufficient passage of time to allow empirical analysis of this important topic (although
we leave that to a future project).
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consistent, albeit not identical, standards across the circuits.322 Pre-1982 patent fee
shifting, while not monolithic in its articulation, was sufficiently uniform, given the
explicit grant of discretion to the trial court, and simply reflected the normal variation
of percolating language. The regional circuits settled upon a broad, flexible doctrine
that promoted trial court discretion and so supported legislative intent as reflected in
statutory language.
It was only with the introduction of the Federal Circuit in 1982 as the sole voice
in intermediate patent appeals that we witness a significant and consequential change
in patent fee-shifting doctrine. The upside of this court specialization was more
uniform doctrine, including in the fee-shifting arena; the downside was that the lack
of percolation led to rigid fee-shifting rules that impermissibly curtailed trial court
discretion in defiance of legislative mandate. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
determined that this path was so divorced from the statute that the Federal Circuit
doctrine was struck down in 2014 in Octane Fitness and Highmark.
In contrast, Lanham Act fee-shifting law percolated through multiple coequal
circuits and it continues to do so to this day. It did not consolidate around a single,
early articulation of a standard, but rather split into a “rainbow of standards,” 323 as
described by Judge Posner in Nightingale.324 However, Judge Posner overstated the
impact of this diversity of language as it is not at all clear that these divergent
standards led to significantly disparate outcomes. In the end, percolation provided
just the sort of variety one would expect, yielding a landscape from which the
Supreme Court could choose the best to consolidate if desired. We see that
percolation clearly has a substantial impact on doctrinal development.
As to the nature of doctrine subject to percolation versus specialization, we
observe important differences. In this case, percolated fee-shifting doctrine adhered
more closely to the statutory mandate for breadth, flexibility, and due deference to
the trial court. When the Supreme Court held that an “exceptional” case was to be
assessed with reference to the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms, the trademark
standards did not require substantial revision. The broad definition of exceptional
already fit within the various frameworks. On the other hand, the Federal Circuit
standard had substantially narrowed the definition of exceptional, at least in the case
of plaintiff misconduct. That appellate court crafted a rule so idiosyncratic that the
Supreme Court was required to essentially erase it and mandate the return to the basic
dictionary definition as a starting point.325 In essence, percolated decisions were like
blades of grass, requiring only a little trimming, while the Federal Circuit’s isolation
grew a tall weed that required eradication.
These results are in line with the more general benefits of percolation that we
hypothesized would be present in the case law. Among the most important is the
potential for percolation to limit judicial hyperactivity. Our analysis suggests that the
Federal Circuit engaged in hyperactive decision-making in the context of fee shifting
by establishing a narrow test that reduced the need for fact finding or the

322.
323.
2001).
324.
2010).
325.

Rose & Rosenquist, supra note 112, at 71.
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 111, 120 (D. Mass.
Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir.
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 553–54 (2014).
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consideration of equity. In contrast, the percolating courts were less inclined toward
hyperactive appropriation of the trial court’s role in determining exceptionality. Even
more clearly, hyperactive decision-making led to an erroneous heightened burden of
proof and inadequately deferential review in the Patent Act context. The percolating
doctrine of the Lanham Act avoided both of these missteps.
In addition, our prediction that percolation would limit judicial activism bore fruit
in the analysis as well. One can argue that the Federal Circuit’s narrow path for
compensation against plaintiffs reflected an activist policy view that patent owners
should have their day in court.326 That policy view led the court to create a rule that
cemented the rights of patent owners and ensured that district courts would find only
the most egregious conduct to be “exceptional.” Conversely, modern Lanham Act
doctrine on fee shifting does not appear to be directed to a policy with any particular
bent for or against plaintiffs. This is not surprising. It is doubtful that regional circuits
view themselves as trademark experts at a level higher than any other area of law,
reducing the motivation to craft policy.327 In addition, if one circuit did step in a
significantly different direction than the others to engage in policymaking, it would
immediately stand out as a circuit split that would attract the attention of the Supreme
Court for possible correction. The threat of reversal is perhaps more powerful than
the gratification a court receives from making a substantive statement on the law.
In the end, in view of the advantages in limiting hyperactivity and activism as
well as the potential (moderate) increase in accuracy, it seems clear that percolation
is the better approach in the context of fee shifting. But is this always the case? Does
this experiment suggest the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit should be
eliminated? In short, no. When the overall role of percolation in the administration
of a property system is considered, one must conclude that it has both positive and
negative impacts. And in the context of patents, the positives of uniformity outweigh
advantages from a large number of percolating courts in many cases.
Patent law plays an incentive role in innovation, and that incentive depends on
some degree of certainty in the law.328 Variation in essential legal tests such as
patentability could be highly detrimental to nationwide commercialization.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has neither the resources nor the inclination to address
the circuit splits in complex patent doctrine that would inevitably arise in the absence
of a specialized appellate court. This, of course, is the very reason the Federal Circuit
was created in the first place.329 Although it would be useful to have percolation in
contexts like fee shifting—when trial court discretion is most important and certainty
in the law is minimized in favor of the need for flexible, ex post remedies—the cost
is too high.

326. See, e.g., Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. Brainlab Medizinische Computersysteme
Gmbh, 603 F.3d 943, 953–54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“We have held that there is a presumption that
an assertion of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good faith.”).
327. As compared to specialist courts, generalist courts enjoy greater benefits of crosspollination, which reduces their activist tendencies. See Oswald, supra note 5, at 260–62.
328. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Patently Uncertain, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
(forthcoming 2019) (describing the nature of uncertainty in patent law and pointing out that it
can be either harmful, a source of strategic advantage, or even beneficial to all participants).
329. See supra Part I.A.
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Despite the judgment that the current Federal Circuit court structure is likely
better overall than a nonspecialized alternative, the results of the percolation
experiment are very relevant. They demonstrate in very clear terms the Federal
Circuit’s tendency to drift away from the statute. The court should appreciate this
fact, and work to keep itself in check when crafting doctrine. The Federal Circuit can
play an important role in reducing the negative effects of its own isolation, and we
hope that this empirical analysis will motivate additional attention to this issue.
CONCLUSION
There are advantages and disadvantages to specialized courts. This is not a
surprise, as one would assume that any system as complex as the judiciary cannot ex
ante be molded to perfection. The existence of such trade-offs has long been
acknowledged in the most prominent American example of a specialized court—the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. However, much of this discussion has
been conducted at a theoretical level.
One such discussion is about the trade-off of having a single answer—
uniformity—versus improving the chances of developing the right answer through
percolation of an issue in several independent appellate courts. This Article analyzed
a serendipitous natural experiment to consider how percolating and isolated courts
develop doctrine. The fact that identical statutory language has moved through two
different appellate settings provides a powerful lens that is ripe for exploration.
The results of our natural experiment are in line with theory, but striking
nonetheless. Our analysis provides strong evidence that percolating courts are more
likely to adhere to the core statutory mandates and refrain from attempting to engage
in pseudo-legislation. In other words, as we predicted, percolation reduces the drift
toward hyperactivity and activism that many have identified in the Federal Circuit.
This does not prove that generalist circuit courts are superior or that specialized
courts should not be used; that is neither an argument we would make nor one that
we think is supported by the larger policy goals of U.S. patent law. But this evidence
does highlight the trade-offs inherent in court structure choices and is an important
first step to empirically uncovering similar specialization-related deficiencies that
could be corrected, thereby enhancing the operation of the intellectual property
system.

